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refactor(security): убрать X-Admin-Token (Caddy basic_auth достаточен) #437

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lekss361 merged 2 commits from refactor/remove-app-admin-auth into main 2026-05-23 10:41:22 +00:00
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lekss361 commented 2026-05-23 10:27:16 +00:00
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Summary

  • Удалён AdminTokenAuth dep из 43 endpoints в 5 admin файлах — Caddy basic_auth (PR #426) даёт достаточную network-level защиту
  • Обновлены docstrings в каждом файле: auth теперь описывается через Caddy
  • backend/.env.example: SCRAPE_ADMIN_TOKEN помечен DEPRECATED с инструкцией rollback

Что НЕ менялось

  • core/deps.py: verify_admin_token + AdminTokenAuth остаются (dead code, rollback safety)
  • frontend: продолжает слать X-Admin-Token header, backend игнорирует
  • env vars и runtime config не тронуты

Файлы

Файл Endpoints
admin_scrape.py 24
admin_cadastre.py 5
admin_jobs.py 3
admin_leads.py 6
admin_weight_profiles.py 5
Итого 43

Verification

  • ruff check: All checks passed
  • ruff-format: passed (auto-reformatted, включено в commit)
  • pre-commit hooks: all passed

Test plan

  • curl /api/v1/admin/scrape/queue без X-Admin-Token → 200 OK (auth только через Caddy)
  • curl с wrong basic_auth → 401 от Caddy
  • curl с правильным basic_auth → 200 OK
## Summary - Удалён `AdminTokenAuth` dep из 43 endpoints в 5 admin файлах — Caddy basic_auth (PR #426) даёт достаточную network-level защиту - Обновлены docstrings в каждом файле: auth теперь описывается через Caddy - `backend/.env.example`: `SCRAPE_ADMIN_TOKEN` помечен DEPRECATED с инструкцией rollback ## Что НЕ менялось - `core/deps.py`: `verify_admin_token` + `AdminTokenAuth` остаются (dead code, rollback safety) - frontend: продолжает слать `X-Admin-Token` header, backend игнорирует - env vars и runtime config не тронуты ## Файлы | Файл | Endpoints | |---|---| | `admin_scrape.py` | 24 | | `admin_cadastre.py` | 5 | | `admin_jobs.py` | 3 | | `admin_leads.py` | 6 | | `admin_weight_profiles.py` | 5 | | **Итого** | **43** | ## Verification - ruff check: All checks passed - ruff-format: passed (auto-reformatted, включено в commit) - pre-commit hooks: all passed ## Test plan - [ ] curl /api/v1/admin/scrape/queue без X-Admin-Token → 200 OK (auth только через Caddy) - [ ] curl с wrong basic_auth → 401 от Caddy - [ ] curl с правильным basic_auth → 200 OK
lekss361 force-pushed refactor/remove-app-admin-auth from 9ed03a8f6a to cd0d80b626 2026-05-23 10:32:29 +00:00 Compare
lekss361 merged commit b233bf91cc into main 2026-05-23 10:41:22 +00:00
lekss361 commented 2026-05-23 10:42:03 +00:00
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Merged via deep-code-reviewer — verdict APPROVE (MINOR with follow-ups).

Caddy coverage verification — PASS

  • gendsgn.ru block: /api/v1/admin/* → handle /api/* → reverse_proxy backend:8000, after import caddy/users.caddy.snippet. Verified Caddyfile:67-69.
  • :80 IP fallback: same pattern Caddyfile:138-142.
  • Backend container ports: 127.0.0.1:8000:8000 — NOT public. docker-compose.prod.yml:62-63.
  • Other Caddy hosts (obsidian.gendsgn.ru, errors.gendsgn.ru, git.gendsgn.ru) route to OTHER containers — no backend leak.
  • Verified PR HEAD cd0d80b6: all 6 admin route files have 0 AdminTokenAuth refs; core/deps.py retains 2 (dead code for rollback).

Trust shift implications

  • 2 layers → 1 layer (Caddy basic_auth only) — known trade-off for pilot.
  • Single point of failure: Caddy mis-deploy / config bug → 43 endpoints open. Mitigation: PR #436 audit log + small Caddyfile blast radius.
  • Internal docker network bypass (intra-container curl localhost:8000/api/v1/admin/*) was already possible — no regression.
  • CSRF: no regression (basic_auth same-origin only, cross-origin needs CORS preflight).
  • Rate limiting: pre-existing gap, no regression.

Follow-ups (non-blocking, can be separate PRs)

  1. Test fixes (Medium):

    • backend/tests/test_admin_weight_profiles.py:407-428 — test_unauthorized_no_token + test_unauthorized_wrong_token will FAIL (endpoint returns 200, not 401).
    • backend/tests/api/v1/test_admin_cadastre.py:298-307 — test_create_job_no_token_returns_401 will FAIL.
    • backend/tests/api/v1/test_admin_ekburg_permits.py:79 — similar pattern, likely FAIL.
    • GHA ci.yml:70 runs uv run pytest -q on refactor/** push → red CI on GitHub mirror if active. Forgejo deploy.yml does NOT gate on pytest, so prod deploy unaffected.

  2. Smoke tests (Low): backend/tests/smoke/test_prod_smoke.py:139-143 — admin_headers fixture should switch to httpx.BasicAuth("admin", SMOKE_BASIC_AUTH_PASS), иначе через Caddy будет 401.

  3. Tradein cron (Low): tradein-mvp/deploy/cron-scrape.sh:64-78 — X-Admin-Token header теперь dead, можно cleanup. Note: script bypasses Caddy via docker exec backend curl localhost:8000/... — внутренний доступ open by design.

  4. Stale comments (nits):

    • backend/app/api/v1/analytics.py:232 — упоминание X-Admin-Token.
    • backend/.env.example:30 — упомянут "PR #436", остальные docstrings ссылаются на PR #426. Off-by-one.

  5. Vault decision (must): создать decisions/2026-05-23_admin_auth_caddy_only.md — trust boundary shift, rollback path, dead code retention timeline (suggest 30 дней post-pilot).

  6. Frontend cleanup (next sprint): frontend/src/app/admin/** + frontend/src/lib/api/weightProfiles.ts продолжают слать X-Admin-Token — backend silently ignores. Регенерировать api-types.ts после deploy backend, потом убрать sends.

  7. Dead code timeline: через 30 дней post-pilot (если Caddy alone подтверждён достаточным) — удалить verify_admin_token + AdminTokenAuth из core/deps.py и SCRAPE_ADMIN_TOKEN из .env.example.

Post-deploy manual smoke (per PR test plan)

  • curl https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue → 401 Caddy
  • curl -u admin:<pass> https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue → 200
  • curl -u admin:wrong https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue → 401 Caddy

Merge commit: b233bf91cc1f05336725f29435c357fcabd4c19b. deploy.yml auto-triggers on backend/** path.

Merged via deep-code-reviewer — verdict APPROVE (MINOR with follow-ups). ## Caddy coverage verification — PASS - `gendsgn.ru` block: `/api/v1/admin/*` → `handle /api/*` → `reverse_proxy backend:8000`, **after** `import caddy/users.caddy.snippet`. Verified Caddyfile:67-69. - `:80` IP fallback: same pattern Caddyfile:138-142. - Backend container `ports: 127.0.0.1:8000:8000` — NOT public. docker-compose.prod.yml:62-63. - Other Caddy hosts (`obsidian.gendsgn.ru`, `errors.gendsgn.ru`, `git.gendsgn.ru`) route to OTHER containers — no backend leak. - Verified PR HEAD `cd0d80b6`: all 6 admin route files have 0 `AdminTokenAuth` refs; `core/deps.py` retains 2 (dead code for rollback). ## Trust shift implications - 2 layers → 1 layer (Caddy basic_auth only) — known trade-off for pilot. - Single point of failure: Caddy mis-deploy / config bug → 43 endpoints open. Mitigation: PR #436 audit log + small Caddyfile blast radius. - Internal docker network bypass (intra-container `curl localhost:8000/api/v1/admin/*`) was already possible — no regression. - CSRF: no regression (basic_auth same-origin only, cross-origin needs CORS preflight). - Rate limiting: pre-existing gap, no regression. ## Follow-ups (non-blocking, can be separate PRs) 1. **Test fixes (Medium):** - `backend/tests/test_admin_weight_profiles.py:407-428` — `test_unauthorized_no_token` + `test_unauthorized_wrong_token` will FAIL (endpoint returns 200, not 401). - `backend/tests/api/v1/test_admin_cadastre.py:298-307` — `test_create_job_no_token_returns_401` will FAIL. - `backend/tests/api/v1/test_admin_ekburg_permits.py:79` — similar pattern, likely FAIL. - GHA `ci.yml:70` runs `uv run pytest -q` on `refactor/**` push → red CI on GitHub mirror if active. Forgejo deploy.yml does NOT gate on pytest, so prod deploy unaffected. 2. **Smoke tests (Low):** `backend/tests/smoke/test_prod_smoke.py:139-143` — `admin_headers` fixture should switch to `httpx.BasicAuth("admin", SMOKE_BASIC_AUTH_PASS)`, иначе через Caddy будет 401. 3. **Tradein cron (Low):** `tradein-mvp/deploy/cron-scrape.sh:64-78` — `X-Admin-Token` header теперь dead, можно cleanup. Note: script bypasses Caddy via `docker exec backend curl localhost:8000/...` — внутренний доступ open by design. 4. **Stale comments (nits):** - `backend/app/api/v1/analytics.py:232` — упоминание X-Admin-Token. - `backend/.env.example:30` — упомянут "PR #436", остальные docstrings ссылаются на PR #426. Off-by-one. 5. **Vault decision (must):** создать `decisions/2026-05-23_admin_auth_caddy_only.md` — trust boundary shift, rollback path, dead code retention timeline (suggest 30 дней post-pilot). 6. **Frontend cleanup (next sprint):** `frontend/src/app/admin/**` + `frontend/src/lib/api/weightProfiles.ts` продолжают слать `X-Admin-Token` — backend silently ignores. Регенерировать `api-types.ts` после deploy backend, потом убрать sends. 7. **Dead code timeline:** через 30 дней post-pilot (если Caddy alone подтверждён достаточным) — удалить `verify_admin_token` + `AdminTokenAuth` из `core/deps.py` и `SCRAPE_ADMIN_TOKEN` из `.env.example`. ## Post-deploy manual smoke (per PR test plan) - `curl https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue` → 401 Caddy - `curl -u admin:<pass> https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue` → 200 - `curl -u admin:wrong https://gendsgn.ru/api/v1/admin/scrape/queue` → 401 Caddy Merge commit: `b233bf91cc1f05336725f29435c357fcabd4c19b`. deploy.yml auto-triggers on `backend/**` path.
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Reference: lekss361/gendesign#437
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