Merge pull request 'feat(tradein/team): team-management API — employees CRUD, quotas, stats (#2554)' (#2563) from feat/tradein-team-api into main

Deep-review PR #2563:
- HIGH: PATCH new_password не ревокал старые сессии сотрудника — sliding-refresh
  продлевал скомпрометированную/чужую сессию бесконечно. Теперь revoke_user_sessions
  вызывается при is_active=False ИЛИ new_password (self-lockout невозможен —
  _fetch_employee_row фильтрует role='employee').
- Medium1: Origin/Referer-check (защита CSRF) на POST/PATCH team-роутах против
  settings.cors_origins; оба заголовка отсутствуют (curl-смоук внутри контейнера) —
  пропускаем, не ломаем прод-смоук.
- Medium2: батч-квота для GET /employees (_batch_quota_status) — было 2N+3 SQL-запросов
  на N сотрудников, стало 5 плоско (замерено: N=10 -> 5 запросов). Добавлена пагинация
  limit(default 50, max 200)/offset.
- Заодно: статические WHERE-ветки вместо f-string-сборки в list_employees;
  monthly_limit теперь сбрасывает account_quota_overrides.unlimited=false и не
  затирает существующий note.

tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/team.py

@@ -0,0 +1,632 @@
+"""Team-management API — CRUD сотрудников, квоты, история (#2554, эпик #2549).
+
+Mounted at `/api/v1/team`; через Caddy `uri strip_prefix /trade-in` это
+`/trade-in/api/v1/team/*` снаружи. `app.services.auth_session.DB_ROLE_PATHS`
+уже закладывает `/api/v1/team/**` в scope роли `manager` (и `admin` через `/**`)
+для `rbac_guard` (см. `app.core.rbac`) — этот роутер добавляет ВТОРОЙ,
+более узкий барьер именно на identity:
+
+  - `current_team_actor` резолвит юзера ТОЛЬКО из session-cookie
+    (`app.services.auth_session.get_session_user`). Legacy
+    `X-Authenticated-User` (Caddy trusted-header, dual-mode) НЕ принимается
+    здесь — team-API новый, не участвует в переходном dual-mode auth. Без
+    валидной cookie — 401, даже если `rbac_guard` пропустил запрос по
+    legacy-заголовку (напр. admin через roles.yaml).
+  - Роль должна быть `admin` или `manager` — иначе 403.
+
+Org-изоляция (главный инвариант фичи): manager видит/меняет ТОЛЬКО своих
+employee (`tradein_users.manager_id = actor.user_id`). Чужой/несуществующий
+employee_id → 404 (НЕ 403) — не подтверждаем/не опровергаем существование
+чужого сотрудника перед manager'ом. См. `_authorize_employee`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Annotated, Any
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Request
+from sqlalchemy import text
+from sqlalchemy.engine import RowMapping
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
+
+from app.core.auth import get_role
+from app.core.config import settings
+from app.core.db import get_db
+from app.core.password import hash_password
+from app.schemas.team import (
+    EmployeeCreateRequest,
+    EmployeeHistoryEntry,
+    EmployeeOut,
+    EmployeeUpdateRequest,
+    QuotaStatusOut,
+)
+from app.services import account_quota
+from app.services.auth_session import get_session_user, revoke_user_sessions
+from app.services.user_events import schedule_event
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TeamActor:
+    """Резолвленный из session-cookie актёр team-API — admin или manager."""
+
+    user_id: int
+    username: str
+    role: str  # "admin" | "manager"
+
+
+async def current_team_actor(
+    request: Request,
+    db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
+) -> TeamActor:
+    """Dependency: session-only identity, роль admin|manager, иначе 401/403.
+
+    Намеренно НЕ читает `X-Authenticated-User` — см. модульный docstring.
+    """
+    token = request.cookies.get(settings.session_cookie_name)
+    if not token:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="valid session required")
+
+    try:
+        session_user = get_session_user(db, token)
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception("team: session lookup failed")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="valid session required") from None
+
+    if session_user is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="valid session required")
+
+    role = session_user["role"]
+    if role not in ("admin", "manager"):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="admin or manager role required")
+
+    return TeamActor(
+        user_id=session_user["user_id"],
+        username=session_user["username"],
+        role=role,
+    )
+
+
+def _origin_host_allowed(candidate: str) -> bool:
+    """True если scheme://netloc *candidate* совпадает с одним из `settings.cors_origins`.
+
+    `cors_origins` уже является источником правды для «какие origin'ы это наш
+    фронт» (см. CORSMiddleware в app/main.py, ENV CORS_ORIGINS) — переиспользуем
+    его вместо нового хардкода."""
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(candidate)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
+        return False
+    origin = f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"
+    return origin in settings.cors_origins
+
+
+def _require_same_origin(request: Request) -> None:
+    """CSRF defense-in-depth (issue #2554 DoD) для state-changing team-роутов
+    (POST/PATCH): `Origin` (или `Referer` как fallback) обязан матчить один из
+    `settings.cors_origins`, иначе 403.
+
+    Оба заголовка отсутствуют → ПРОПУСКАЕМ (не 403). Причина: это единственный
+    надёжный сигнал non-browser клиента в этом стеке — curl-смоуки внутри
+    контейнера (см. `.claude/rules/tradein.md` "Тестировать HTTP только ВНУТРИ
+    контейнера", `docker exec tradein-backend curl ...`) не шлют ни один из этих
+    заголовков, а реальный браузер (fetch/XHR/form) ВСЕГДА прикладывает Origin
+    на unsafe-методах (POST/PATCH) — так что "оба отсутствуют" практически
+    невозможно для настоящего кросс-сайтового CSRF через браузер. Session-cookie
+    уже стоит на `SameSite=Lax` (см. `app.api.v1.auth.login`) — это первый рубеж
+    против CSRF, Origin-check — второй.
+    """
+    candidate = request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer")
+    if candidate is None:
+        return
+    if not _origin_host_allowed(candidate):
+        logger.warning(
+            "team: Origin/Referer mismatch %r on %s — possible CSRF", candidate, request.url.path
+        )
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="origin not allowed")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _fetch_employee_row(db: Session, employee_id: int) -> RowMapping | None:
+    return (
+        db.execute(
+            text(
+                """
+            SELECT id, username, display_name, org_name, email, is_active,
+                   manager_id, created_at
+            FROM tradein_users
+            WHERE id = :id AND role = 'employee'
+            """
+            ),
+            {"id": employee_id},
+        )
+        .mappings()
+        .fetchone()
+    )
+
+
+def _authorize_employee(actor: TeamActor, row: RowMapping | None) -> RowMapping:
+    """404 (НЕ 403) если сотрудник не найден ИЛИ принадлежит другому manager'у.
+
+    Org-изоляция: manager может видеть/менять только `manager_id == actor.user_id`.
+    404 вместо 403 — не палим существование чужого employee_id.
+    """
+    if row is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="employee not found")
+    if actor.role == "manager" and row["manager_id"] != actor.user_id:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="employee not found")
+    return row
+
+
+def _upsert_quota_override(
+    db: Session, username: str, monthly_limit: int, actor_username: str
+) -> None:
+    """Upsert персонального лимита. Явная установка monthly_limit — сигнал "хочу
+    numeric-квоту", поэтому ВСЕГДА сбрасывает `unlimited=false` (иначе лимит может
+    молча не применяться — прежний unlimited-грант выигрывал бы у нового limit).
+    `note` — НЕ затирается, если уже задан (`COALESCE`): не перезаписываем
+    человеко-читаемую причину прошлого гранта (напр. "пилот, грант ...") молча
+    сгенерированной строкой; note проставляется только при первом upsert записи.
+    """
+    db.execute(
+        text(
+            """
+            INSERT INTO account_quota_overrides (username, monthly_limit, unlimited, note)
+            VALUES (:username, CAST(:monthly_limit AS integer), false, :note)
+            ON CONFLICT (username) DO UPDATE SET
+                monthly_limit = EXCLUDED.monthly_limit,
+                unlimited = false,
+                note = COALESCE(account_quota_overrides.note, EXCLUDED.note),
+                updated_at = now()
+            """
+        ),
+        {
+            "username": username,
+            "monthly_limit": monthly_limit,
+            "note": f"team-api: set by {actor_username}",
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def _batch_quota_status(db: Session, usernames: list[str]) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Батч-версия `account_quota.get_status` для N сотрудников — 2 SQL-запроса
+    вместо 2N (было 2N+3 на GET /employees, HIGH/Medium2 review PR #2563).
+
+    Семантика ИДЕНТИЧНА `account_quota.is_unlimited`/`user_limit`/`get_status`:
+    unlimited = admin-роль (roles.yaml, in-memory, без похода в БД) ИЛИ
+    `account_quota_overrides.unlimited=true`; limit = override.monthly_limit,
+    иначе глобальный `account_quota.MONTHLY_LIMIT`.
+    """
+    if not usernames:
+        return {}
+
+    overrides = (
+        db.execute(
+            text(
+                """
+                SELECT username, monthly_limit, unlimited
+                FROM account_quota_overrides
+                WHERE username = ANY(CAST(:usernames AS text[]))
+                """
+            ),
+            {"usernames": usernames},
+        )
+        .mappings()
+        .all()
+    )
+    override_by_username = {r["username"]: r for r in overrides}
+
+    period = account_quota.current_period()
+    usage_rows = (
+        db.execute(
+            text(
+                """
+                SELECT username, used
+                FROM account_estimate_usage
+                WHERE username = ANY(CAST(:usernames AS text[])) AND period_month = :period
+                """
+            ),
+            {"usernames": usernames, "period": period},
+        )
+        .mappings()
+        .all()
+    )
+    used_by_username = {r["username"]: r["used"] for r in usage_rows}
+
+    result: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    for username in usernames:
+        override = override_by_username.get(username)
+        try:
+            is_admin_role = get_role(username) == "admin"
+        except KeyError:
+            is_admin_role = False
+        unlimited = is_admin_role or bool(override is not None and override["unlimited"])
+        limit = (
+            int(override["monthly_limit"])
+            if override is not None and override["monthly_limit"] is not None
+            else account_quota.MONTHLY_LIMIT
+        )
+        used = used_by_username.get(username, 0)
+        if unlimited:
+            result[username] = {
+                "limit": limit,
+                "used": used,
+                "remaining": limit,
+                "unlimited": True,
+            }
+        else:
+            remaining = max(0, limit - max(0, used))
+            result[username] = {
+                "limit": limit,
+                "used": used,
+                "remaining": remaining,
+                "unlimited": False,
+            }
+    return result
+
+
+def _employee_out(row: RowMapping, quota: dict[str, Any]) -> EmployeeOut:
+    return EmployeeOut(
+        id=row["id"],
+        username=row["username"],
+        display_name=row["display_name"],
+        org_name=row["org_name"],
+        email=row["email"],
+        is_active=row["is_active"],
+        manager_id=row["manager_id"],
+        created_at=row["created_at"],
+        quota=QuotaStatusOut(**quota),
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# POST /employees
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@router.post("/employees", response_model=EmployeeOut, status_code=201)
+async def create_employee(
+    body: EmployeeCreateRequest,
+    actor: Annotated[TeamActor, Depends(current_team_actor)],
+    db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
+    _origin_check: Annotated[None, Depends(_require_same_origin)],
+) -> EmployeeOut:
+    """Создать сотрудника. Роль всегда `employee`.
+
+    manager_id: для actor.role == manager — принудительно свой id (любое
+    значение из тела ИГНОРИРУЕТСЯ, org-изоляция инвариант #2554). Для
+    actor.role == admin — опционально из тела, валидируется что указанный id
+    существует и role='manager' (иначе 422).
+    """
+    existing = db.execute(
+        text("SELECT id FROM tradein_users WHERE username = :u"),
+        {"u": body.username},
+    ).fetchone()
+    if existing is not None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="username already exists")
+
+    try:
+        password_hash = hash_password(body.password)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=str(e)) from None
+
+    manager_id: int | None
+    if actor.role == "manager":
+        # Инвариант org-изоляции: manager не может создать сотрудника под
+        # чужим manager_id — любое значение из тела игнорируется молча.
+        manager_id = actor.user_id
+    else:
+        manager_id = body.manager_id
+        if manager_id is not None:
+            mgr = db.execute(
+                text("SELECT id FROM tradein_users WHERE id = :id AND role = 'manager'"),
+                {"id": manager_id},
+            ).fetchone()
+            if mgr is None:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=422,
+                    detail="manager_id does not reference an existing manager",
+                )
+
+    try:
+        row = (
+            db.execute(
+                text(
+                    """
+                INSERT INTO tradein_users
+                    (username, password_hash, role, manager_id, display_name, org_name,
+                     email, is_active)
+                VALUES
+                    (:username, :password_hash, 'employee', :manager_id, :display_name,
+                     :org_name, :email, true)
+                RETURNING id, username, display_name, org_name, email, is_active,
+                          manager_id, created_at
+                """
+                ),
+                {
+                    "username": body.username,
+                    "password_hash": password_hash,
+                    "manager_id": manager_id,
+                    "display_name": body.display_name,
+                    "org_name": body.org_name,
+                    "email": body.email,
+                },
+            )
+            .mappings()
+            .fetchone()
+        )
+    except IntegrityError:
+        # TOCTOU: два конкурентных POST с одинаковым username между pre-check
+        # выше и этим INSERT — UNIQUE-констрейнт на tradein_users.username ловит.
+        db.rollback()
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="username already exists") from None
+
+    assert row is not None  # RETURNING на успешный INSERT всегда отдаёт строку
+
+    if body.monthly_limit is not None:
+        _upsert_quota_override(db, body.username, body.monthly_limit, actor.username)
+
+    db.commit()
+
+    schedule_event(
+        event_type="employee_created",
+        username=actor.username,
+        payload={
+            "employee_id": row["id"],
+            "employee_username": row["username"],
+            "manager_id": manager_id,
+        },
+    )
+
+    quota = account_quota.get_status(db, body.username)
+    return _employee_out(row, quota)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PATCH /employees/{id}
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@router.patch("/employees/{employee_id}", response_model=EmployeeOut)
+async def update_employee(
+    employee_id: int,
+    body: EmployeeUpdateRequest,
+    actor: Annotated[TeamActor, Depends(current_team_actor)],
+    db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
+    _origin_check: Annotated[None, Depends(_require_same_origin)],
+) -> EmployeeOut:
+    """Частичное обновление сотрудника — block/unblock, лимит, профиль, пароль.
+
+    manager может патчить ТОЛЬКО своих (manager_id == actor.user_id), иначе 404.
+    При is_active=False ИЛИ смене пароля (new_password) — обязательно revoke всех
+    сессий (HIGH, deep-review PR #2563): без этого блокировка/reset не подействуют
+    до истечения TTL текущей сессии сотрудника — хуже того, sliding-refresh
+    (`app.services.auth_session.get_session_user`) продлевает `expires_at` на
+    КАЖДОМ запросе, так что скомпрометированная/чужая сессия живёт неограниченно
+    долго, а не «до TTL». `revoke_user_sessions` сам называет смену пароля своим
+    use-case — см. его докстринг.
+    """
+    row = _fetch_employee_row(db, employee_id)
+    row = _authorize_employee(actor, row)
+
+    new_password_hash: str | None = None
+    if body.new_password is not None:
+        try:
+            new_password_hash = hash_password(body.new_password)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=str(e)) from None
+
+    db.execute(
+        text(
+            """
+            UPDATE tradein_users
+            SET display_name = COALESCE(:display_name, display_name),
+                org_name = COALESCE(:org_name, org_name),
+                email = COALESCE(:email, email),
+                is_active = COALESCE(CAST(:is_active AS boolean), is_active),
+                password_hash = COALESCE(:password_hash, password_hash),
+                updated_at = now()
+            WHERE id = :id
+            """
+        ),
+        {
+            "display_name": body.display_name,
+            "org_name": body.org_name,
+            "email": body.email,
+            "is_active": body.is_active,
+            "password_hash": new_password_hash,
+            "id": employee_id,
+        },
+    )
+
+    if body.monthly_limit is not None:
+        _upsert_quota_override(db, row["username"], body.monthly_limit, actor.username)
+
+    if body.is_active is False or body.new_password is not None:
+        # Обязательно ПОСЛЕ UPDATE, ДО финального commit — revoke_user_sessions
+        # коммитит сам (см. app.services.auth_session), это флашит и наш
+        # предшествующий UPDATE/quota-upsert в той же сессии. Self-lockout
+        # невозможен: _fetch_employee_row фильтрует role='employee', actor
+        # (admin|manager) никогда не может патчить сам себя через этот роут.
+        revoke_user_sessions(db, employee_id)
+
+    db.commit()
+
+    changed_profile_fields = [
+        f
+        for f, v in (
+            ("display_name", body.display_name),
+            ("org_name", body.org_name),
+            ("email", body.email),
+        )
+        if v is not None
+    ]
+    if changed_profile_fields:
+        schedule_event(
+            event_type="employee_updated",
+            username=actor.username,
+            payload={
+                "employee_id": employee_id,
+                "employee_username": row["username"],
+                "fields": changed_profile_fields,
+            },
+        )
+    if body.new_password is not None:
+        schedule_event(
+            event_type="employee_password_reset",
+            username=actor.username,
+            payload={"employee_id": employee_id, "employee_username": row["username"]},
+        )
+    if body.is_active is not None:
+        schedule_event(
+            event_type="employee_blocked" if body.is_active is False else "employee_unblocked",
+            username=actor.username,
+            payload={"employee_id": employee_id, "employee_username": row["username"]},
+        )
+    if body.monthly_limit is not None:
+        schedule_event(
+            event_type="quota_changed",
+            username=actor.username,
+            payload={
+                "employee_id": employee_id,
+                "employee_username": row["username"],
+                "monthly_limit": body.monthly_limit,
+            },
+        )
+
+    updated_row = _fetch_employee_row(db, employee_id)
+    assert updated_row is not None  # только что успешно обновили эту же строку
+    quota = account_quota.get_status(db, updated_row["username"])
+    return _employee_out(updated_row, quota)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /employees
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+# Два статических варианта WHERE (НЕ f-string/динамическая сборка — Medium/
+# "заодно" review PR #2563: значения биндятся параметрами и без того безопасны,
+# но статические ветки не провоцируют будущие правки в сторону конкатенации SQL).
+_LIST_EMPLOYEES_BY_MANAGER_SQL = text(
+    """
+    SELECT id, username, display_name, org_name, email, is_active, manager_id, created_at
+    FROM tradein_users
+    WHERE role = 'employee' AND manager_id = :manager_id
+    ORDER BY created_at DESC
+    LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset
+    """
+)
+
+_LIST_EMPLOYEES_ALL_SQL = text(
+    """
+    SELECT id, username, display_name, org_name, email, is_active, manager_id, created_at
+    FROM tradein_users
+    WHERE role = 'employee'
+    ORDER BY created_at DESC
+    LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset
+    """
+)
+
+
+@router.get("/employees", response_model=list[EmployeeOut])
+async def list_employees(
+    actor: Annotated[TeamActor, Depends(current_team_actor)],
+    db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
+    manager_id: Annotated[int | None, Query()] = None,
+    limit: Annotated[int, Query(ge=1, le=200)] = 50,
+    offset: Annotated[int, Query(ge=0)] = 0,
+) -> list[EmployeeOut]:
+    """Список сотрудников. manager видит только своих; admin — всех, опц. ?manager_id=.
+
+    Квота — ОДИН батч-запрос на всю страницу (`_batch_quota_status`), не N+1
+    (Medium2, review PR #2563: было 2N+3 SQL-запросов на N сотрудников).
+    """
+    if actor.role == "manager":
+        rows = (
+            db.execute(
+                _LIST_EMPLOYEES_BY_MANAGER_SQL,
+                {"manager_id": actor.user_id, "limit": limit, "offset": offset},
+            )
+            .mappings()
+            .all()
+        )
+    elif manager_id is not None:
+        rows = (
+            db.execute(
+                _LIST_EMPLOYEES_BY_MANAGER_SQL,
+                {"manager_id": manager_id, "limit": limit, "offset": offset},
+            )
+            .mappings()
+            .all()
+        )
+    else:
+        rows = (
+            db.execute(_LIST_EMPLOYEES_ALL_SQL, {"limit": limit, "offset": offset}).mappings().all()
+        )
+
+    quota_by_username = _batch_quota_status(db, [row["username"] for row in rows])
+    return [_employee_out(row, quota_by_username[row["username"]]) for row in rows]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /employees/{id}/history
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@router.get("/employees/{employee_id}/history", response_model=list[EmployeeHistoryEntry])
+async def employee_history(
+    employee_id: int,
+    actor: Annotated[TeamActor, Depends(current_team_actor)],
+    db: Annotated[Session, Depends(get_db)],
+    limit: Annotated[int, Query(ge=1, le=200)] = 50,
+    offset: Annotated[int, Query(ge=0)] = 0,
+) -> list[EmployeeHistoryEntry]:
+    """История оценок сотрудника (адрес/дата/результат) — из `user_events`,
+    LEFT JOIN `trade_in_estimates` за фактическим результатом.
+
+    Та же org-проверка что и в PATCH: чужой employee_id → 404.
+    """
+    row = _fetch_employee_row(db, employee_id)
+    row = _authorize_employee(actor, row)
+
+    rows = (
+        db.execute(
+            text(
+                """
+                SELECT
+                    CAST(ue.estimate_id AS text) AS estimate_id,
+                    ue.payload ->> 'address' AS address,
+                    ue.payload ->> 'area_m2' AS area_m2,
+                    ue.payload ->> 'rooms' AS rooms,
+                    te.median_price,
+                    te.confidence,
+                    te.n_analogs,
+                    ue.created_at
+                FROM user_events ue
+                LEFT JOIN trade_in_estimates te ON te.id = ue.estimate_id
+                WHERE ue.username = :username AND ue.event_type = 'estimate_request'
+                ORDER BY ue.created_at DESC
+                LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset
+                """
+            ),
+            {"username": row["username"], "limit": limit, "offset": offset},
+        )
+        .mappings()
+        .all()
+    )
+
+    return [EmployeeHistoryEntry.model_validate(dict(r)) for r in rows]

tradein-mvp/backend/app/main.py

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ from app.api.v1 import (
     me,
     search,
     support,
+    team,
     trade_in,
 )
 from app.core.config import settings
@@ -183,3 +184,4 @@ app.include_router(support.router, prefix="/api/v1/trade-in", tags=["trade-in-su
 app.include_router(buildings.router, prefix="/api/v1/buildings", tags=["buildings"])
 app.include_router(search.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["search"])
 app.include_router(me.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["me"])
+app.include_router(team.router, prefix="/api/v1/team", tags=["team"])

tradein-mvp/backend/app/schemas/team.py

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+"""Pydantic-схемы team-management API (#2554, эпик #2549).
+
+CRUD сотрудников (`tradein_users.role = 'employee'`), квоты, история оценок.
+Org-изоляция (manager видит/меняет только своих employee) реализована в
+`app.api.v1.team`, эти схемы — только форма запросов/ответов.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator
+
+# ASCII-only — не-ASCII username ломает downstream identity-пропагацию
+# (`app.core.rbac._propagate_authenticated_user` кодирует latin-1 с
+# errors="replace"), поэтому валидация формы обязательна на границе API,
+# а не только на уровне БД.
+_USERNAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{3,64}$")
+
+
+class QuotaStatusOut(BaseModel):
+    """Статус месячной квоты оценок — вложен в `EmployeeOut`."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    limit: int
+    used: int
+    remaining: int
+    unlimited: bool
+
+
+class EmployeeCreateRequest(BaseModel):
+    """`POST /employees` — создать сотрудника. Роль всегда `employee` (не в теле)."""
+
+    username: str
+    password: str
+    display_name: str | None = None
+    org_name: str | None = None
+    email: str | None = None
+    monthly_limit: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1)
+    # Только для actor.role == admin — опциональная привязка к конкретному manager.
+    # Для actor.role == manager это поле ИГНОРИРУЕТСЯ (принудительно свой id) —
+    # см. app.api.v1.team.create_employee.
+    manager_id: int | None = None
+
+    @field_validator("username")
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_username(cls, v: str) -> str:
+        if not _USERNAME_RE.match(v):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "username must be 3-64 ASCII chars: letters, digits, dot, underscore, hyphen"
+            )
+        return v
+
+
+class EmployeeUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
+    """`PATCH /employees/{id}` — частичное обновление, все поля опциональны."""
+
+    is_active: bool | None = None
+    monthly_limit: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1)
+    display_name: str | None = None
+    org_name: str | None = None
+    email: str | None = None
+    new_password: str | None = None
+
+
+class EmployeeOut(BaseModel):
+    """Одна строка в `GET /employees` + ответ `POST`/`PATCH /employees/{id}`."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    id: int
+    username: str
+    display_name: str | None = None
+    org_name: str | None = None
+    email: str | None = None
+    is_active: bool
+    manager_id: int | None = None
+    created_at: datetime
+    quota: QuotaStatusOut
+
+
+class EmployeeHistoryEntry(BaseModel):
+    """Одна строка истории оценок сотрудника — `GET /employees/{id}/history`.
+
+    Источник — `user_events` (event_type='estimate_request', паттерн
+    `app.api.v1.audit.account_drilldown`), LEFT JOIN на `trade_in_estimates`
+    за фактическим результатом (median_price/confidence/n_analogs) — join
+    может не сматчиться (старая запись без estimate_id / оценка insufficient_data),
+    поэтому все result-поля nullable.
+    """
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    estimate_id: str | None = None
+    address: str | None = None
+    area_m2: str | None = None
+    rooms: str | None = None
+    median_price: int | None = None
+    confidence: str | None = None
+    n_analogs: int | None = None
+    created_at: datetime

tradein-mvp/backend/tests/test_team_api.py

@@ -0,0 +1,903 @@
+"""Integration tests for #2554 team-management API — employees CRUD, quotas, history.
+
+Same pattern as `tests/test_auth_api.py`: real `rbac_guard` + real `auth.router` /
+`team.router` wired into an isolated FastAPI test app, with an in-memory fake DB
+(`_Store`/`_FakeDB`) dispatching on SQL text standing in for `tradein_users` /
+`tradein_sessions` / `account_quota_overrides` / `account_estimate_usage` /
+`user_events` / `trade_in_estimates`.
+
+`app.core.rbac.SessionLocal` (middleware, no FastAPI DI) and `app.core.db.get_db`
+(auth.router / team.router `Depends(get_db)`) both point at the SAME `_Store`
+instance per test — a session created via POST /login is immediately visible to
+rbac_guard's own DB round trip AND to `current_team_actor`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import Any
+from uuid import uuid4
+
+os.environ.setdefault("DATABASE_URL", "postgresql+psycopg://test:test@localhost:5432/test")
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.api.v1 import auth as auth_router
+from app.api.v1 import team as team_router
+from app.core import auth as auth_mod
+from app.core import config
+from app.core.db import get_db
+from app.core.password import hash_password
+from app.core.rbac import rbac_guard
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fake DB backing tradein_users / tradein_sessions / quota / user_events
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _Store:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.users: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}  # username -> user dict
+        self.sessions: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        self.quota_overrides: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        self.usage: dict[tuple[str, str], int] = {}
+        self.estimates: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}  # estimate_id -> result fields
+        self.events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []  # user_events rows (history source)
+        self._next_id = 1
+        self.query_count = 0  # db.execute() calls — N+1 regression guard (review PR #2563)
+
+    def add_user(
+        self,
+        username: str,
+        password_hash: str | None,
+        *,
+        role: str = "employee",
+        manager_id: int | None = None,
+        is_active: bool = True,
+        display_name: str | None = None,
+        org_name: str | None = None,
+        email: str | None = None,
+    ) -> int:
+        uid = self._next_id
+        self._next_id += 1
+        self.users[username] = {
+            "id": uid,
+            "username": username,
+            "password_hash": password_hash,
+            "role": role,
+            "manager_id": manager_id,
+            "display_name": display_name,
+            "org_name": org_name,
+            "email": email,
+            "is_active": is_active,
+            "created_at": datetime.now(UTC),
+        }
+        return uid
+
+    def user_by_id(self, uid: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        for u in self.users.values():
+            if u["id"] == uid:
+                return u
+        return None
+
+    def add_estimate_event(
+        self,
+        username: str,
+        *,
+        address: str | None = "ул. Ленина, 1",
+        area_m2: str | None = "45",
+        rooms: str | None = "2",
+        estimate_id: str | None = None,
+        median_price: int | None = None,
+        confidence: str | None = None,
+        n_analogs: int | None = None,
+        created_at: datetime | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        eid = estimate_id or str(uuid4())
+        self.events.append(
+            {
+                "username": username,
+                "event_type": "estimate_request",
+                "estimate_id": eid,
+                "payload": {"address": address, "area_m2": area_m2, "rooms": rooms},
+                "created_at": created_at or datetime.now(UTC),
+            }
+        )
+        if median_price is not None or confidence is not None or n_analogs is not None:
+            self.estimates[eid] = {
+                "median_price": median_price,
+                "confidence": confidence,
+                "n_analogs": n_analogs,
+            }
+
+
+class _Result:
+    """Minimal cursor-result stand-in: `.fetchone()`/`.fetchall()` (attribute-style
+    Row) AND `.mappings().fetchone()`/`.all()` (dict-style RowMapping) — enough
+    surface for the SQL used by app.api.v1.team / app.api.v1.auth /
+    app.services.auth_session / app.services.account_quota."""
+
+    def __init__(self, rows: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+        self._rows = rows
+
+    def fetchone(self) -> SimpleNamespace | None:
+        return SimpleNamespace(**self._rows[0]) if self._rows else None
+
+    def fetchall(self) -> list[SimpleNamespace]:
+        return [SimpleNamespace(**r) for r in self._rows]
+
+    def mappings(self) -> _Mappings:
+        return _Mappings(self._rows)
+
+
+class _Mappings:
+    def __init__(self, rows: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+        self._rows = rows
+
+    def fetchone(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        return dict(self._rows[0]) if self._rows else None
+
+    def all(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        return [dict(r) for r in self._rows]
+
+
+class _FakeDB:
+    """Minimal Session stand-in dispatching on SQL text — see module docstring."""
+
+    def __init__(self, store: _Store) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> _FakeDB:
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *exc: object) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def commit(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def rollback(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def execute(self, stmt: object, params: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> _Result:
+        sql = str(stmt)
+        p = params or {}
+        s = self.store
+        s.query_count += 1
+
+        # ---- tradein_sessions ----
+        if "INSERT INTO tradein_sessions" in sql:
+            now = datetime.now(UTC)
+            s.sessions[p["token"]] = {
+                "user_id": p["user_id"],
+                "expires_at": now + timedelta(hours=p["ttl_hours"]),
+                "last_seen_at": now,
+            }
+            return _Result([])
+
+        if "UPDATE tradein_sessions" in sql and "SET last_seen_at" in sql:
+            sess = s.sessions.get(p["token"])
+            if sess is not None:
+                now = datetime.now(UTC)
+                sess["last_seen_at"] = now
+                sess["expires_at"] = now + timedelta(hours=p["ttl_hours"])
+            return _Result([])
+
+        if "DELETE FROM tradein_sessions WHERE token" in sql:
+            s.sessions.pop(p["token"], None)
+            return _Result([])
+
+        if "DELETE FROM tradein_sessions WHERE user_id" in sql:
+            uid = p["user_id"]
+            for tok in [t for t, sess in s.sessions.items() if sess["user_id"] == uid]:
+                del s.sessions[tok]
+            return _Result([])
+
+        if "FROM tradein_sessions s" in sql and "JOIN tradein_users u" in sql:
+            sess = s.sessions.get(p["token"])
+            if sess is None:
+                return _Result([])
+            user = s.user_by_id(sess["user_id"])
+            if user is None:
+                return _Result([])
+            return _Result(
+                [
+                    {
+                        "user_id": sess["user_id"],
+                        "expires_at": sess["expires_at"],
+                        "last_seen_at": sess["last_seen_at"],
+                        "username": user["username"],
+                        "role": user["role"],
+                        "display_name": user["display_name"],
+                        "org_name": user["org_name"],
+                        "email": user["email"],
+                        "is_active": user["is_active"],
+                    }
+                ]
+            )
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: login lookup (get_user_by_username) ----
+        if "password_hash, role, is_active" in sql and "FROM tradein_users" in sql:
+            user = s.users.get(p["username"])
+            return _Result([user] if user is not None else [])
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: create ----
+        if "INSERT INTO tradein_users" in sql:
+            uid = s._next_id
+            s._next_id += 1
+            created_at = datetime.now(UTC)
+            row = {
+                "id": uid,
+                "username": p["username"],
+                "password_hash": p["password_hash"],
+                "role": "employee",
+                "manager_id": p["manager_id"],
+                "display_name": p["display_name"],
+                "org_name": p["org_name"],
+                "email": p["email"],
+                "is_active": True,
+                "created_at": created_at,
+            }
+            s.users[p["username"]] = row
+            return _Result([dict(row)])
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: manager_id validation ----
+        if "role = 'manager'" in sql:
+            user = s.user_by_id(p["id"])
+            match = user is not None and user["role"] == "manager"
+            return _Result([{"id": user["id"]}] if match else [])
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: list employees (has explicit ORDER BY) ----
+        if "role = 'employee'" in sql and "ORDER BY created_at DESC" in sql:
+            rows = [u for u in s.users.values() if u["role"] == "employee"]
+            if "manager_id" in p:
+                rows = [u for u in rows if u["manager_id"] == p["manager_id"]]
+            rows = sorted(rows, key=lambda u: u["created_at"], reverse=True)
+            offset, limit = p.get("offset", 0), p.get("limit", len(rows))
+            rows = rows[offset : offset + limit]
+            return _Result(
+                [
+                    {
+                        "id": u["id"],
+                        "username": u["username"],
+                        "display_name": u["display_name"],
+                        "org_name": u["org_name"],
+                        "email": u["email"],
+                        "is_active": u["is_active"],
+                        "manager_id": u["manager_id"],
+                        "created_at": u["created_at"],
+                    }
+                    for u in rows
+                ]
+            )
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: fetch single employee by id ----
+        if "role = 'employee'" in sql:
+            user = s.user_by_id(p["id"])
+            if user is None or user["role"] != "employee":
+                return _Result([])
+            return _Result(
+                [
+                    {
+                        "id": user["id"],
+                        "username": user["username"],
+                        "display_name": user["display_name"],
+                        "org_name": user["org_name"],
+                        "email": user["email"],
+                        "is_active": user["is_active"],
+                        "manager_id": user["manager_id"],
+                        "created_at": user["created_at"],
+                    }
+                ]
+            )
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: uniqueness pre-check ----
+        if sql.strip().startswith("SELECT id FROM tradein_users WHERE username"):
+            user = s.users.get(p["u"])
+            return _Result([{"id": user["id"]}] if user is not None else [])
+
+        # ---- tradein_users: update (PATCH) ----
+        if "UPDATE tradein_users" in sql and "SET display_name = COALESCE" in sql:
+            user = s.user_by_id(p["id"])
+            assert user is not None
+            if p.get("display_name") is not None:
+                user["display_name"] = p["display_name"]
+            if p.get("org_name") is not None:
+                user["org_name"] = p["org_name"]
+            if p.get("email") is not None:
+                user["email"] = p["email"]
+            if p.get("is_active") is not None:
+                user["is_active"] = p["is_active"]
+            if p.get("password_hash") is not None:
+                user["password_hash"] = p["password_hash"]
+            return _Result([])
+
+        # ---- account_quota_overrides upsert: unlimited always reset to False,
+        # note preserved (COALESCE) if a row already existed — mirrors real SQL.
+        if "INSERT INTO account_quota_overrides" in sql:
+            existing_override = s.quota_overrides.get(p["username"])
+            preserved_note = (
+                existing_override["note"] if existing_override is not None else None
+            ) or p["note"]
+            s.quota_overrides[p["username"]] = {
+                "monthly_limit": p["monthly_limit"],
+                "unlimited": False,
+                "note": preserved_note,
+            }
+            return _Result([])
+
+        # ---- account_quota_overrides: batch (list_employees) ----
+        if "SELECT username, monthly_limit, unlimited" in sql:
+            rows = [
+                {"username": u, "monthly_limit": ov["monthly_limit"], "unlimited": ov["unlimited"]}
+                for u, ov in s.quota_overrides.items()
+                if u in p["usernames"]
+            ]
+            return _Result(rows)
+
+        if "SELECT unlimited FROM account_quota_overrides" in sql:
+            override = s.quota_overrides.get(p["u"])
+            return _Result([{"unlimited": override["unlimited"]}] if override else [])
+
+        if "SELECT monthly_limit FROM account_quota_overrides" in sql:
+            override = s.quota_overrides.get(p["u"])
+            return _Result([{"monthly_limit": override["monthly_limit"]}] if override else [])
+
+        # ---- account_estimate_usage: batch (list_employees) ----
+        if "SELECT username, used" in sql:
+            rows = [
+                {"username": u, "used": used}
+                for (u, period), used in s.usage.items()
+                if u in p["usernames"] and period == p["period"]
+            ]
+            return _Result(rows)
+
+        # ---- account_estimate_usage: single (account_quota.get_status) ----
+        if "SELECT used FROM account_estimate_usage" in sql:
+            used = s.usage.get((p["u"], p["p"]))
+            return _Result([{"used": used}] if used is not None else [])
+
+        # ---- user_events + trade_in_estimates (history) ----
+        if "FROM user_events ue" in sql:
+            matches = [
+                e
+                for e in s.events
+                if e["username"] == p["username"] and e["event_type"] == "estimate_request"
+            ]
+            matches.sort(key=lambda e: e["created_at"], reverse=True)
+            page = matches[p["offset"] : p["offset"] + p["limit"]]
+            rows = []
+            for e in page:
+                extra = s.estimates.get(e["estimate_id"], {})
+                rows.append(
+                    {
+                        "estimate_id": e["estimate_id"],
+                        "address": e["payload"].get("address"),
+                        "area_m2": e["payload"].get("area_m2"),
+                        "rooms": e["payload"].get("rooms"),
+                        "median_price": extra.get("median_price"),
+                        "confidence": extra.get("confidence"),
+                        "n_analogs": extra.get("n_analogs"),
+                        "created_at": e["created_at"],
+                    }
+                )
+            return _Result(rows)
+
+        raise AssertionError(f"unhandled fake SQL in test_team_api: {sql!r}")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test app
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _build_test_app(store: _Store) -> FastAPI:
+    app = FastAPI()
+    app.middleware("http")(rbac_guard)
+    app.include_router(auth_router.router, prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
+    app.include_router(team_router.router, prefix="/api/v1/team", tags=["team"])
+
+    def _override_get_db():  # generator dependency — matches app.core.db.get_db shape
+        yield _FakeDB(store)
+
+    app.dependency_overrides[get_db] = _override_get_db
+    return app
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _reset_state(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    auth_mod.reset_cache_for_tests()
+    auth_router._LOGIN_LIMITER._hits.clear()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(config.settings, "auth_mode", "dual")
+    # team.py / auth.py events go through schedule_event (own SessionLocal(), fire-
+    # and-forget) — captured into a list instead of hitting a real DB.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(team_router, "schedule_event", lambda **kw: _EVENTS.append(kw))
+    monkeypatch.setattr(auth_router, "schedule_event", lambda **kw: None)
+    _EVENTS.clear()
+
+
+_EVENTS: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def store() -> _Store:
+    return _Store()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client(store: _Store, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> TestClient:
+    monkeypatch.setattr("app.core.rbac.SessionLocal", lambda: _FakeDB(store))
+    # base_url=https:// — login sets a Secure cookie; see test_auth_api.py for why
+    # a plain-http TestClient would silently drop it.
+    return TestClient(_build_test_app(store), base_url="https://testserver")
+
+
+def _login(client: TestClient, username: str, password: str) -> None:
+    resp = client.post("/api/v1/auth/login", json={"username": username, "password": password})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# POST /employees — happy path + validation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_manager_creates_employee_forces_own_manager_id(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_alice", "password": "Secret123!", "display_name": "Алиса"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["username"] == "emp_alice"
+    assert body["manager_id"] == mgr_id
+    assert body["quota"]["limit"] > 0
+    assert store.users["emp_alice"]["password_hash"] is not None
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "employee_created" for e in _EVENTS)
+    created_event = next(e for e in _EVENTS if e["event_type"] == "employee_created")
+    # Пароль никогда не попадает в аудит-событие.
+    assert "Secret123!" not in str(created_event)
+
+
+def test_admin_creates_employee_with_explicit_manager_id(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_bob", "password": "Secret123!", "manager_id": mgr_id},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["manager_id"] == mgr_id
+
+
+def test_admin_creates_employee_without_manager_id(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees", json={"username": "emp_free", "password": "Secret123!"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["manager_id"] is None
+
+
+def test_admin_create_employee_invalid_manager_id_422(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_x", "password": "Secret123!", "manager_id": 999},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_create_employee_non_ascii_username_422(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "сотрудник", "password": "Secret123!"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 422
+
+
+def test_create_employee_duplicate_username_409(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    store.add_user("emp_dup", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_dup", "password": "Secret123!"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 409
+
+
+def test_create_employee_no_session_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees", json={"username": "emp_x", "password": "Secret123!"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_create_employee_employee_role_403(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee")
+    _login(client, "emp_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees", json={"username": "emp_x", "password": "Secret123!"}
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+def test_employee_role_403_on_all_team_routes(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee")
+    _login(client, "emp_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    assert client.get("/api/v1/team/employees").status_code == 403
+    assert client.patch("/api/v1/team/employees/1", json={}).status_code == 403
+    assert client.get("/api/v1/team/employees/1/history").status_code == 403
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Org isolation — manager A vs manager B
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_manager_a_cannot_see_manager_b_employee(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_a = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    mgr_b = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    store.add_user("emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_a)
+    store.add_user("emp_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_b)
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    usernames = {e["username"] for e in resp.json()}
+    assert usernames == {"emp_a"}
+
+
+def test_manager_a_patch_manager_b_employee_404(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_a = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    mgr_b = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_b_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_b
+    )
+    assert mgr_a  # used only to seed manager_id != mgr_b
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_b_id}", json={"display_name": "hacked"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_manager_a_history_manager_b_employee_404(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_a = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    mgr_b = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_b_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_b
+    )
+    assert mgr_a
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_b_id}/history")
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_manager_post_with_foreign_manager_id_creates_under_self(
+    client: TestClient, store: _Store
+) -> None:
+    """POST с чужим manager_id в теле от лица manager — ИГНОРИРУЕТСЯ, сотрудник
+    создаётся под ЕГО собственным manager_id, не под указанным чужим."""
+    mgr_a_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    mgr_b_id = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    assert mgr_a_id != mgr_b_id
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={
+            "username": "emp_spoof",
+            "password": "Secret123!",
+            "manager_id": mgr_b_id,
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["manager_id"] == mgr_a_id
+    assert store.users["emp_spoof"]["manager_id"] == mgr_a_id
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PATCH /employees/{id} — block/unblock/quota/profile/password
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_block_employee_revokes_sessions(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("EmpSecret1!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+
+    # Employee logs in first — real session created via the real auth flow.
+    emp_client = TestClient(client.app, base_url="https://testserver")
+    _login(emp_client, "emp_a", "EmpSecret1!")
+    assert any(sess["user_id"] == emp_id for sess in store.sessions.values())
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"is_active": False})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["is_active"] is False
+
+    # Blocking must have revoked ALL of emp_a's sessions.
+    assert not any(sess["user_id"] == emp_id for sess in store.sessions.values())
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "employee_blocked" for e in _EVENTS)
+
+
+def test_reset_password_revokes_old_sessions(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    """HIGH (deep-review PR #2563): смена пароля обязана ревокать ВСЕ существующие
+    сессии сотрудника — иначе скомпрометированная/чужая сессия переживает reset
+    (sliding-refresh в auth_session.py продлевает её бесконечно, а не «до TTL»)."""
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("OldSecret1!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+
+    emp_client = TestClient(client.app, base_url="https://testserver")
+    _login(emp_client, "emp_a", "OldSecret1!")
+    assert any(sess["user_id"] == emp_id for sess in store.sessions.values())
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"new_password": "NewSecret2!"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+
+    # Password reset must have revoked ALL of emp_a's pre-existing sessions —
+    # not just when is_active is explicitly set to False.
+    assert not any(sess["user_id"] == emp_id for sess in store.sessions.values())
+
+
+def test_unblock_employee_event(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id, is_active=False
+    )
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"is_active": True})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["is_active"] is True
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "employee_unblocked" for e in _EVENTS)
+
+
+def test_patch_monthly_limit_reflected_in_quota_status(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"monthly_limit": 30})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["quota"]["limit"] == 30
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "quota_changed" for e in _EVENTS)
+
+    listing = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees")
+    assert listing.status_code == 200
+    entry = next(e for e in listing.json() if e["id"] == emp_id)
+    assert entry["quota"]["limit"] == 30
+
+
+def test_patch_reset_password_no_password_in_events(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("OldSecret1!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"new_password": "NewSecret2!"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert any(e["event_type"] == "employee_password_reset" for e in _EVENTS)
+    assert "NewSecret2!" not in str(_EVENTS)
+
+    emp_client = TestClient(client.app, base_url="https://testserver")
+    login_resp = emp_client.post(
+        "/api/v1/auth/login", json={"username": "emp_a", "password": "NewSecret2!"}
+    )
+    assert login_resp.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_patch_no_session_401(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    resp = client.patch(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}", json={"is_active": False})
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /employees — list + admin filter
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_admin_sees_all_employees_and_filters_by_manager(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    mgr_a = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    mgr_b = store.add_user("mgr_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    store.add_user("emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_a)
+    store.add_user("emp_b", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_b)
+
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+    resp_all = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees")
+    assert resp_all.status_code == 200
+    assert {e["username"] for e in resp_all.json()} == {"emp_a", "emp_b"}
+
+    resp_filtered = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees", params={"manager_id": mgr_a})
+    assert resp_filtered.status_code == 200
+    assert {e["username"] for e in resp_filtered.json()} == {"emp_a"}
+
+
+def test_list_employees_query_count_is_not_n_plus_1(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    """Medium2 (deep-review PR #2563): pre-fix measured 2N+3 = 23 SQL queries for
+    N=10 employees (per-employee `account_quota.get_status`). Batch quota lookup
+    (`_batch_quota_status`) must keep the query count constant regardless of N."""
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    for i in range(10):
+        store.add_user(f"emp_{i}", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id)
+
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+    store.query_count = 0  # reset after login's own DB traffic
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert len(resp.json()) == 10
+    # rbac_guard session lookup (1) + current_team_actor session lookup (1) +
+    # list query (1) + 2 batch quota queries = 5, flat regardless of N.
+    assert store.query_count <= 5, f"expected O(1) queries for N=10, got {store.query_count}"
+
+
+def test_list_employees_pagination(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    for i in range(5):
+        store.add_user(f"emp_{i}", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id)
+
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees", params={"limit": 2, "offset": 1})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert len(resp.json()) == 2
+
+
+def test_list_employees_limit_max_200(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("admin1", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="admin")
+    _login(client, "admin1", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/team/employees", params={"limit": 500})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# CSRF defense-in-depth — Origin/Referer check on state-changing team routes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_create_employee_origin_mismatch_403(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_evil", "password": "Secret123!"},
+        headers={"Origin": "https://evil.example"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "emp_evil" not in store.users
+
+
+def test_create_employee_origin_allowed(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    allowed_origin = config.settings.cors_origins[0]
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_ok", "password": "Secret123!"},
+        headers={"Origin": allowed_origin},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+
+
+def test_create_employee_no_origin_no_referer_allowed(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    """curl-смоук внутри контейнера не шлёт ни Origin, ни Referer — не должен ломаться."""
+    store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/api/v1/team/employees",
+        json={"username": "emp_curl", "password": "Secret123!"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+
+
+def test_patch_employee_origin_mismatch_403(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.patch(
+        f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}",
+        json={"display_name": "hacked"},
+        headers={"Referer": "https://evil.example/csrf.html"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert store.users["emp_a"]["display_name"] != "hacked"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /employees/{id}/history
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_employee_history_happy_path(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    now = datetime.now(UTC)
+    store.add_estimate_event(
+        "emp_a",
+        address="ул. Малышева, 10",
+        median_price=6_500_000,
+        confidence="high",
+        n_analogs=12,
+        created_at=now - timedelta(minutes=5),
+    )
+    store.add_estimate_event("emp_a", address="ул. Мамина-Сибиряка, 5", created_at=now)
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}/history")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert len(body) == 2
+    assert body[0]["address"] == "ул. Мамина-Сибиряка, 5"  # most recent first
+    priced = next(e for e in body if e["address"] == "ул. Малышева, 10")
+    assert priced["median_price"] == 6_500_000
+    assert priced["confidence"] == "high"
+
+
+def test_employee_history_pagination(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    for i in range(5):
+        store.add_estimate_event("emp_a", address=f"адрес-{i}")
+
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+    resp = client.get(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}/history", params={"limit": 2, "offset": 1})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert len(resp.json()) == 2
+
+
+def test_employee_history_limit_max_200(client: TestClient, store: _Store) -> None:
+    mgr_id = store.add_user("mgr_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="manager")
+    emp_id = store.add_user(
+        "emp_a", hash_password("Secret123!"), role="employee", manager_id=mgr_id
+    )
+    _login(client, "mgr_a", "Secret123!")
+
+    resp = client.get(f"/api/v1/team/employees/{emp_id}/history", params={"limit": 500})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422

tradein-mvp/frontend/src/app/login/page.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+"use client";
+
+/**
+ * #2555 (эпик #2549) — login-форма для новой DB-backed session auth
+ * (POST /api/v1/auth/login, см. `tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/auth.py`).
+ *
+ * Не гейтится RouteGuard'ом (см. `components/auth/RouteGuard.tsx` —
+ * `isLoginPage` bypass) — иначе редирект-петля: 401 от /me на /login тоже
+ * пытался бы увести на /login.
+ *
+ * `next=` читаем вручную из `window.location.search` (SSR-guard), а НЕ
+ * через `next/navigation` `useSearchParams()` — тот форсит Suspense boundary
+ * и ломает `next build` (см. `app/v2/page.tsx: readUrlId` — тот же паттерн,
+ * уже принятый в этом репо).
+ */
+
+import { useState } from "react";
+import type { CSSProperties, FormEvent } from "react";
+import { useRouter } from "next/navigation";
+import { useMutation, useQueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
+
+import { apiFetch, HTTPError } from "@/lib/api";
+import { ME_QUERY_KEY } from "@/lib/useMe";
+
+interface LoginInput {
+  username: string;
+  password: string;
+}
+
+async function loginRequest(input: LoginInput): Promise<void> {
+  await apiFetch<{ ok: boolean }>("/api/v1/auth/login", {
+    method: "POST",
+    body: JSON.stringify(input),
+  });
+}
+
+function readNextParam(): string | null {
+  if (typeof window === "undefined") return null;
+  return new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get("next");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Open-redirect guard: принимаем только внутренний путь, начинающийся
+ * ровно с одного "/" — не "//host" (protocol-relative URL) и не "/\host"
+ * (браузеры местами трактуют backslash как forward slash в URL-парсинге).
+ *
+ * PR #2562 review finding 1: WHATWG URL-парсер (который `router.push`
+ * использует под капотом) убирает ВСЕ ASCII tab/CR/LF из строки ПЕРЕД
+ * парсингом — так `"/\t//evil"` для наивного regex выглядит как безопасный
+ * путь с одним leading slash (символ в позиции 1 — таб, не "/" и не "\"),
+ * а после навигации превращается в `"//evil"` (protocol-relative → чужой
+ * origin). Убираем те же символы ДО валидации, чтобы regex видел ту же
+ * строку, что увидит парсер.
+ *
+ * PR #2562 review finding 2: `next=/login` (или `/login?...`) после успешного
+ * логина кидал бы юзера обратно на форму входа (RouteGuard не гейтит
+ * `/login`) — dead-end. Фолбэк на "/" в этом случае.
+ */
+function sanitizeNext(next: string | null): string {
+  if (!next) return "/";
+  const cleaned = next.replace(/[\t\r\n]/g, "");
+  if (!/^\/(?!\/|\\)/.test(cleaned)) return "/";
+  if (
+    cleaned === "/login" ||
+    cleaned.startsWith("/login?") ||
+    cleaned.startsWith("/login#")
+  ) {
+    return "/";
+  }
+  return cleaned;
+}
+
+function loginErrorMessage(error: unknown): string {
+  if (error instanceof HTTPError) {
+    if (error.status === 401) return "Неверный логин или пароль";
+    if (error.status === 429) {
+      return "Слишком много попыток. Попробуйте через несколько минут";
+    }
+  }
+  return "Не удалось войти. Проверьте подключение и попробуйте ещё раз";
+}
+
+const cardStyle: CSSProperties = {
+  background: "var(--bg-card)",
+  border: "1px solid var(--border-card)",
+  borderRadius: 12,
+  padding: "32px 28px",
+  maxWidth: 380,
+  width: "100%",
+};
+
+const labelStyle: CSSProperties = {
+  display: "block",
+  fontSize: 12,
+  fontWeight: 500,
+  color: "var(--fg-secondary)",
+  marginBottom: 6,
+};
+
+const inputStyle: CSSProperties = {
+  width: "100%",
+  boxSizing: "border-box",
+  height: 40,
+  padding: "0 12px",
+  border: "1px solid var(--border-card)",
+  borderRadius: 8,
+  fontSize: 14,
+  color: "var(--fg-primary)",
+  background: "var(--bg-card)",
+  fontFamily: "inherit",
+};
+
+export default function LoginPage() {
+  const router = useRouter();
+  const queryClient = useQueryClient();
+  const [username, setUsername] = useState("");
+  const [password, setPassword] = useState("");
+
+  const loginMutation = useMutation({
+    mutationFn: loginRequest,
+    onSuccess: () => {
+      queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ME_QUERY_KEY });
+      router.push(sanitizeNext(readNextParam()));
+    },
+  });
+
+  function handleSubmit(e: FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>) {
+    e.preventDefault();
+    if (loginMutation.isPending) return;
+    loginMutation.mutate({ username: username.trim(), password });
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <main
+      style={{
+        minHeight: "100vh",
+        background: "var(--bg-app)",
+        display: "flex",
+        alignItems: "center",
+        justifyContent: "center",
+        padding: 24,
+        fontFamily: "Inter, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif",
+      }}
+    >
+      <style>{`
+        @keyframes login-spin { to { transform: rotate(360deg); } }
+        .login-spinner { animation: login-spin .7s linear infinite; }
+        .login-input:focus-visible {
+          outline: none;
+          border-color: var(--accent);
+          box-shadow: 0 0 0 2px var(--accent-soft);
+        }
+        .login-submit:hover:not(:disabled) { background: var(--accent-hover); }
+      `}</style>
+
+      <form onSubmit={handleSubmit} style={cardStyle} aria-label="Вход в Меру">
+        <h1
+          style={{
+            margin: "0 0 8px",
+            fontSize: 22,
+            fontWeight: 600,
+            color: "var(--fg-primary)",
+            lineHeight: 1.25,
+          }}
+        >
+          Вход
+        </h1>
+        <p
+          style={{
+            margin: "0 0 24px",
+            fontSize: 14,
+            color: "var(--fg-secondary)",
+            lineHeight: 1.5,
+          }}
+        >
+          Войдите, чтобы продолжить работу с Мерой.
+        </p>
+
+        <div style={{ marginBottom: 16 }}>
+          <label style={labelStyle} htmlFor="login-username">
+            Логин
+          </label>
+          <input
+            id="login-username"
+            name="username"
+            type="text"
+            autoComplete="username"
+            required
+            autoFocus
+            className="login-input"
+            style={inputStyle}
+            value={username}
+            onChange={(e) => setUsername(e.target.value)}
+            disabled={loginMutation.isPending}
+          />
+        </div>
+
+        <div style={{ marginBottom: 24 }}>
+          <label style={labelStyle} htmlFor="login-password">
+            Пароль
+          </label>
+          <input
+            id="login-password"
+            name="password"
+            type="password"
+            autoComplete="current-password"
+            required
+            className="login-input"
+            style={inputStyle}
+            value={password}
+            onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
+            disabled={loginMutation.isPending}
+          />
+        </div>
+
+        {loginMutation.isError ? (
+          <p
+            role="alert"
+            style={{
+              margin: "0 0 16px",
+              padding: "8px 12px",
+              borderRadius: 8,
+              background: "var(--danger-soft)",
+              color: "var(--danger)",
+              fontSize: 13,
+              lineHeight: 1.4,
+            }}
+          >
+            {loginErrorMessage(loginMutation.error)}
+          </p>
+        ) : null}
+
+        <button
+          type="submit"
+          className="login-submit"
+          disabled={loginMutation.isPending}
+          style={{
+            width: "100%",
+            display: "flex",
+            alignItems: "center",
+            justifyContent: "center",
+            gap: 8,
+            background: "var(--accent)",
+            color: "#FFFFFF",
+            border: "none",
+            borderRadius: 8,
+            padding: "10px 16px",
+            fontSize: 14,
+            fontWeight: 500,
+            cursor: loginMutation.isPending ? "wait" : "pointer",
+            opacity: loginMutation.isPending ? 0.75 : 1,
+            fontFamily: "inherit",
+          }}
+        >
+          {loginMutation.isPending ? (
+            <>
+              <svg
+                className="login-spinner"
+                width={16}
+                height={16}
+                viewBox="0 0 24 24"
+                fill="none"
+                aria-hidden="true"
+              >
+                <circle
+                  cx="12"
+                  cy="12"
+                  r="9"
+                  stroke="rgba(255,255,255,0.35)"
+                  strokeWidth="3"
+                />
+                <path
+                  d="M21 12a9 9 0 0 0-9-9"
+                  stroke="#FFFFFF"
+                  strokeWidth="3"
+                  strokeLinecap="round"
+                />
+              </svg>
+              Входим…
+            </>
+          ) : (
+            "Войти"
+          )}
+        </button>
+      </form>
+    </main>
+  );
+}

tradein-mvp/frontend/src/app/v2/page.tsx

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ import {
 } from "@/lib/trade-in-api";
 import { useQuota } from "@/lib/useQuota";
 import { useMe } from "@/lib/useMe";
-import { logout } from "@/lib/logout";
+import { useLogout } from "@/lib/useLogout";
 
 // OUTER HUD FRAME + 4 corner brackets (design lines 31-37). Decorative,
 // non-interactive overlay drawn over the artboard gradient. The frame has
@@ -524,6 +524,10 @@ export default function TradeInV2Page() {
   // (#2046) — known profile fields fall back to username / brand ?? role / ""
   // when absent (never invented). undefined while loading → TopNav «Гость».
   const me = useMe();
+  // #2555: session-logout (POST /api/v1/auth/logout + local /me-cache
+  // invalidate + redirect на /login) — replaces the legacy basic_auth-cache
+  // -bust `logout()` for the v2 TopNav (new /login-form users).
+  const logoutMutation = useLogout();
 
   // Dashboard sub-hooks — each resolves independently; failure degrades its
   // section via the mappers (null input) rather than blanking the page.
@@ -973,7 +977,7 @@ export default function TradeInV2Page() {
                 onNavigate={setNav}
                 reports={reportsCount ?? 0}
                 user={topNavUser}
-                onLogout={logout}
+                onLogout={() => logoutMutation.mutate()}
               />
             </nav>
             <main

tradein-mvp/frontend/src/components/auth/RouteGuard.tsx

@@ -10,9 +10,17 @@
  * RBAC config (`auth/roles.yaml`) использует абсолютные пути сайта
  * (`/trade-in/**`, `/trade-in/api/v1/admin/**`), поэтому перед проверкой
  * isPathAllowed мы префиксим pathname через NEXT_PUBLIC_BASE_PATH.
+ *
+ * #2555 login redirect: `router.push()` (как и `usePathname()`) работает в
+ * пространстве путей БЕЗ basePath — Next сам префиксит basePath на навигации
+ * (см. `next.config.ts` комментарий `basePath`). Поэтому `next=` в query
+ * строится из `rawPath` (БЕЗ basePath), а не `absolutePath` — иначе
+ * `/login/page.tsx` сделал бы `router.push("/trade-in/history")`, и Next
+ * задвоил бы префикс в `/trade-in/trade-in/history`.
  */
 
-import { usePathname } from "next/navigation";
+import { useRouter, usePathname } from "next/navigation";
+import { useEffect } from "react";
 
 import { NoAccessScreen } from "@/components/auth/NoAccessScreen";
 import { HTTPError } from "@/lib/api";
@@ -29,6 +37,7 @@ interface RouteGuardProps {
 
 export function RouteGuard({ children }: RouteGuardProps) {
   const rawPath = usePathname() ?? "/";
+  const router = useRouter();
   // Абсолютный путь сайта: BASE_PATH + rawPath. Аккуратно с двойным слэшем
   // на `/`: `BASE_PATH = "/trade-in"` + `"/"` → `/trade-in/` (ок).
   const absolutePath = BASE_PATH
@@ -36,21 +45,51 @@ export function RouteGuard({ children }: RouteGuardProps) {
     : rawPath;
   const { data, isLoading, error } = useMe();
 
+  // #2555: /login сам себя не гейтит — иначе редирект-петля (401 на /me →
+  // редирект на /login → RouteGuard на /login опять видит 401 → редирект…).
+  const isLoginPage = rawPath === "/login";
+
+  // Prod-only: сессия истекла/отсутствует → уводим на логин вместо старого
+  // NoAccessScreen variant="session". Редирект — побочный эффект (нельзя
+  // router.push во время рендера), поэтому useEffect; пока он не сработал,
+  // рендерим null (см. return ниже), чтобы не мигал старый contents.
+  const shouldRedirectToLogin =
+    !isLoginPage &&
+    process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" &&
+    error instanceof HTTPError &&
+    error.status === 401;
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!shouldRedirectToLogin) return;
+    // PR #2562 review finding 3: deep-links carry их state в query (`/v2?id=
+    // <uuid>` — см. next.config.ts redirect comment про restore-by-id). Без
+    // `window.location.search` юзер, чья сессия истекла mid-session на такой
+    // ссылке, после логина попадал бы на голый `/v2` и терял отчёт. Effect
+    // — гарантированно client-side (useEffect тело никогда не бежит на SSR),
+    // поэтому `window` тут безопасен без typeof-guard.
+    const next = `${rawPath}${window.location.search}`;
+    router.push(`/login?next=${encodeURIComponent(next)}`);
+  }, [shouldRedirectToLogin, rawPath, router]);
+
   // #801: preview-страница самодостаточна (свой QueryClient с фейковым me),
   // RBAC к ней не применяем. Только под флагом — в проде по умолчанию выключено.
   if (ENABLE_PREVIEW && rawPath.startsWith("/ui-preview")) {
     return <>{children}</>;
   }
 
+  if (isLoginPage) {
+    return <>{children}</>;
+  }
+
   if (isLoading) return null;
 
   if (error instanceof HTTPError && error.status === 401) {
     // Dev without Caddy: 401 is normal, mount the app so local dev works.
-    // Prod: mounting children on 401 causes TanStack Query re-subscribe storm
-    // (each new observer on errored query triggers a refetch). Show session screen
-    // instead — prevents the subtree from mounting, kills the loop.
     if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") return <>{children}</>;
-    return <NoAccessScreen variant="session" />;
+    // Prod: редирект уже запущен эффектом выше — ничего не рендерим, пока
+    // навигация не завершится (mounting children on 401 causes TanStack
+    // Query re-subscribe storm, см. историю до #2555 в git blame).
+    return null;
   }
 
   if (error instanceof HTTPError && error.status === 403) {

tradein-mvp/frontend/src/lib/useLogout.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"use client";
+
+/**
+ * #2555: session-logout — POST /api/v1/auth/logout (revoke DB session +
+ * очистка httponly cookie tradein_session), затем чистим локальный
+ * TanStack Query /me-кэш и уходим на /login.
+ *
+ * NB: это НЕ замена legacy `@/lib/logout.ts` (Caddy basic_auth cache-bust +
+ * hard reload) — тот остаётся для страниц/пользователей на старом
+ * trusted-header механизме (см. `app.core.rbac` dual-mode resolver).
+ * useLogout — для юзеров, залогиненных через новую /login форму (#2552).
+ *
+ * Backend logout — best-effort по духу (revoke конкретной сессии), поэтому
+ * локальный logout (кэш + редирект) выполняется в `onSettled`, а не только
+ * `onSuccess`: сетевой сбой / уже-протухшая сессия не должны запирать юзера
+ * на странице без возможности разлогиниться.
+ */
+
+import { useMutation, useQueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
+import { useRouter } from "next/navigation";
+
+import { apiFetch } from "@/lib/api";
+import { ME_QUERY_KEY } from "@/lib/useMe";
+
+async function logoutRequest(): Promise<void> {
+  await apiFetch<{ ok: boolean }>("/api/v1/auth/logout", { method: "POST" });
+}
+
+export function useLogout() {
+  const queryClient = useQueryClient();
+  const router = useRouter();
+
+  return useMutation({
+    mutationFn: logoutRequest,
+    onSettled: () => {
+      queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ME_QUERY_KEY });
+      router.push("/login");
+    },
+  });
+}

tradein-mvp/frontend/src/lib/useMe.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,18 @@ import { useQuery } from "@tanstack/react-query";
 
 import { apiFetchWithStatus, HTTPError } from "@/lib/api";
 
-export type Role = "admin" | "pilot" | "expired";
+// #2555: session-auth (POST /api/v1/auth/login) вводит новые роли
+// admin|manager|employee. Legacy Caddy trusted-header роли (pilot|analyst|
+// expired) остаются — backend `/api/v1/me` может отдать любую из обеих
+// групп в зависимости от того, каким механизмом пришёл юзер (dual-mode
+// resolver, см. `tradein-mvp/backend/app/core/rbac.py`).
+export type Role =
+  | "admin"
+  | "manager"
+  | "employee"
+  | "pilot"
+  | "analyst"
+  | "expired";
 
 export interface UserScope {
   username: string;