Foundation PR: unified "our projects" source the §25.3 overlap engine (PR2)
will consume. Two origins normalized to OwnProject (class/timing/price/unit-mix):
- current <- domrf_kn_objects filtered by settings.own_developer_ids (numeric
prefix of composite dev_id; empty -> [] graceful, no DB hit, no hardcoded id)
- future <- new manual-entry own_planned_project entity (migration 148)
Adds OWN_DEVELOPER_IDS config (comma-sep -> list[int], default []),
own_planned_project table (range/unit_mix CHECKs via IMMUTABLE helper, generated
geom), /api/v1/own-projects CRUD (created_by from X-Authenticated-User), and
get_own_portfolio(db). Per-source graceful degradation; psycopg-v3 CAST clean.
Does not touch special_indices.py or parcels.py (out of scope).
Refs #1169
Promote district to a first-class `location` entity (ТЗ §8.2), ADDITIVE — no
district->FK refactor. New `location` table keyed by district_name (joinable by
string), carrying 4 normalized [0,1] indices (NULL when no data, never 0):
- infra: _district_poi_score / _city_avg_poi_score (per-district POI aggregate)
- competition: market_metrics.overstock_index (available/stuck competing supply
— orthogonal to demand; NOT sell-through, which is market-heat correlated w/ demand)
- demand: market_metrics.unit_velocity (saturating /50)
- future_supply: future_supply_pressure.index (passthrough, already 0..1)
- data/sql/146_location.sql: idempotent table + UNIQUE(district_name) + range
CHECK + centroid GIST
- services/site_finder/locations.py: compute_location_indices (reuses forecast
per-district fns) + refresh_locations (SAVEPOINT per-row, CAST, ON CONFLICT)
- workers/tasks/location_refresh.py + beat (Mon 07:00 MSK, after supply-layers)
- api/v1/locations.py: read-only GET list + GET by name (analyst+admin via rbac,
frontend pilot-gated)
- tests: 34 (normalization 0..1/null, competition⊥demand orthogonality, idempotent
upsert, read API list/by-name/404)
Part of #948 (Part A insight shipped #1164).
Insight = аналитик пишет free-form intel про локацию/участок с пометкой
«непублично» (is_confidential, §7.13/§8.9). CRUD под /api/v1/insights;
created_by из X-Authenticated-User (не из тела — спуфинг автора невозможен).
Зеркало custom_pois: raw-SQL service + Pydantic v2 schemas, sync def handlers
(threadpool, off event loop).
- data/sql/145_insight.sql: table insight (idempotent, geom GENERATED из lon/lat,
индексы district/cad_num/is_confidential/created_by/GIST); аддитивно расширяет
CHECK audit_log.action += insight_write (тот же constraint ck_audit_log_action,
to_regclass-guarded, superset — не ломает #962-аудит; НЕ правит applied 144).
- audit_middleware.classify_path: method-aware insight_write для POST/PUT/DELETE
/api/v1/insights (GET-чтения не аудируются); обратно совместимо с parcels.
- ACL: backend rbac_guard hard-блокирует только /api/v1/admin/*; pilot отсекается
frontend RouteGuard + Caddy (как parcels/custom_pois). is_confidential — стораемая
пометка без per-record backend-гейта (analyst видит, per #962-политике).
- tests: 28 insight (CRUD+filters+required+#261 commit) + 5 audit. 86 зелёных, ruff.
Part B (Location first-class, §8.2) — отдельный follow-up.
Refs #948.
EPIC18/§19. analyst sees everything (deals, insights, exports, site-finder,
analytics, concept) EXCEPT admin/data-management. Enforcement is backend-hard
(the existing rbac_guard already 403s any non-admin role on /api/v1/admin/*, so
adding the role auto-blocks it) + frontend (deny_paths via /me) + audit.
§19 audit: new best-effort HTTP middleware logs the sensitive actions
(analyze / forecast / forecast-export) to a new audit_log table after the
response. Audit failures never break or delay-fail the request (2-layer
try/except + finally close). Registered INNER to rbac_guard so only authorized
requests are audited (a 403 short-circuits before audit). classify_path matches
export before forecast (anchored).
- auth/roles.yaml: analyst role (paths /**, deny admin-mgmt) + analysttest QA user
- core/auth.py (+ tradein mirror): Role Literal += analyst
- core/audit_middleware.py (new) + main.py registration
- data/sql/144_audit_log.sql (idempotent; auto-applies)
- tests: analyst rbac (403 admin / 200 parcels) + 11 audit cases
No data-level ACL (analyst sees data per policy) -> no #948 dependency. No new
deps. parcels.py untouched. Real analyst logins still need adding to
caddy/users.caddy.snippet (devops).
Refs #962.
The whole backend api/v1 test suite hits `app` via TestClient mimo Caddy, so
rbac_guard (app/main.py) 401'd every authed request (no X-Authenticated-User)
— 112 tests red, the suite effectively dead (which is how #994's district 500
shipped uncaught). Add `settings.testing` (default False — prod RBAC untouched)
+ a strictly-gated bypass at the top of rbac_guard; tests/conftest.py enables it
(env TESTING=1 + settings.testing=True before app import).
Security: bypass fires ONLY when settings.testing is True, which is set NOWHERE
in prod (default False; only tests/conftest.py flips it). RBAC's 401/403 logic
stays covered by tests/test_rbac.py (its own middleware copy, ignores the flag).
Effect: 112 → 42 failed, 1590 → 1660 passed. Remaining 42 (+5 mv_layout env
errors) are stale-mock/assertion drift + env-required tests — fixed in CI-rehab
2/3. Foundation for a real Forgejo pytest gate (3/3).
Refs #944.
Replaces tradein.cad_buildings snapshot with live postgres_fdw foreign table reading gendesign.v_tradein_cad_buildings. Fixes /trade-in/api/v1/geocode/reverse 500 (Nominatim ban) and address_not_geocoded for cadastre addresses (e.g. Хохрякова 81).
Security (deep-review fixes):
- 100_tradein_fdw_role.sql: passwordless CREATE ROLE; password set by deploy.yml ALTER ROLE bootstrap reading GENDESIGN_FDW_PASSWORD from backend/.env.runtime (via psql :'pw' var → format %L — injection-safe).
- core/fdw.py: regex whitelist [A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,256} on password, ValueError without echoing value, try/rollback on commit.
- 060_postgres_fdw_extension.sql: connect_timeout='3' on FOREIGN SERVER + ALTER ADD/SET fallback.
- geocoder.py: _cadastral_forward_sync / _cadastral_reverse_sync wrapped in asyncio.to_thread.
- 100_*.sql: REVOKE ALL ON ALL TABLES/SEQUENCES/FUNCTIONS IN SCHEMA public; only GRANT SELECT on v_tradein_cad_buildings.
- pg_user_mappings query handles PUBLIC mapping (usename IS NULL).
Tests: 3 SQL-injection guards on ensure_fdw_user_mapping + rewritten cadastral suite.
Добавляет endpoint для приёма заявок на пилот (lead-gen).
INSERT в pilot_requests, response {id, created_at, status}.
Telegram-уведомление — TODO (creds не настроены, #307 SF-B3).
Migration: data/sql/118_pilot_requests.sql
- JobSetting ORM model (JSONB extra_config) + Pydantic schemas
- GET/PUT /api/v1/admin/jobs/settings + /{job_type} (X-Admin-Token auth)
- celery_app.py builds beat_schedule from job_settings DB (env fallback
retained for safety on first deploy / DB unreachable)
- nspd_geo task reads rate_ms from job_settings when per-job row has
no override
- enqueue/resume geo jobs route to queue_name from job_settings
- Worker container: --queues=celery,scrape_kn,geo (one container,
three named queues — kn sweep no longer blocks nspd_geo)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
3 pages (market, PRINZIP drilldown, developers leaderboard) on top of
existing v_developer_full_metrics + domrf_realization views. ECharts on
the frontend, FastAPI router /api/v1/analytics on the backend.
