2 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6400ebde24 |
feat(insights): manual-entry Insight entity CRUD + §19 audit (#948 part A)
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Insight = аналитик пишет free-form intel про локацию/участок с пометкой «непублично» (is_confidential, §7.13/§8.9). CRUD под /api/v1/insights; created_by из X-Authenticated-User (не из тела — спуфинг автора невозможен). Зеркало custom_pois: raw-SQL service + Pydantic v2 schemas, sync def handlers (threadpool, off event loop). - data/sql/145_insight.sql: table insight (idempotent, geom GENERATED из lon/lat, индексы district/cad_num/is_confidential/created_by/GIST); аддитивно расширяет CHECK audit_log.action += insight_write (тот же constraint ck_audit_log_action, to_regclass-guarded, superset — не ломает #962-аудит; НЕ правит applied 144). - audit_middleware.classify_path: method-aware insight_write для POST/PUT/DELETE /api/v1/insights (GET-чтения не аудируются); обратно совместимо с parcels. - ACL: backend rbac_guard hard-блокирует только /api/v1/admin/*; pilot отсекается frontend RouteGuard + Caddy (как parcels/custom_pois). is_confidential — стораемая пометка без per-record backend-гейта (analyst видит, per #962-политике). - tests: 28 insight (CRUD+filters+required+#261 commit) + 5 audit. 86 зелёных, ruff. Part B (Location first-class, §8.2) — отдельный follow-up. Refs #948. |
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| 86828d0388 |
feat(rbac): add analyst role + §19 audit-log middleware (#962)
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EPIC18/§19. analyst sees everything (deals, insights, exports, site-finder, analytics, concept) EXCEPT admin/data-management. Enforcement is backend-hard (the existing rbac_guard already 403s any non-admin role on /api/v1/admin/*, so adding the role auto-blocks it) + frontend (deny_paths via /me) + audit. §19 audit: new best-effort HTTP middleware logs the sensitive actions (analyze / forecast / forecast-export) to a new audit_log table after the response. Audit failures never break or delay-fail the request (2-layer try/except + finally close). Registered INNER to rbac_guard so only authorized requests are audited (a 403 short-circuits before audit). classify_path matches export before forecast (anchored). - auth/roles.yaml: analyst role (paths /**, deny admin-mgmt) + analysttest QA user - core/auth.py (+ tradein mirror): Role Literal += analyst - core/audit_middleware.py (new) + main.py registration - data/sql/144_audit_log.sql (idempotent; auto-applies) - tests: analyst rbac (403 admin / 200 parcels) + 11 audit cases No data-level ACL (analyst sees data per policy) -> no #948 dependency. No new deps. parcels.py untouched. Real analyst logins still need adding to caddy/users.caddy.snippet (devops). Refs #962. |
