Merge pull request 'fix(tradein/security): photo-upload — чанковое чтение с капом 10MB + Caddy request_body 12MB (#2233)' (#2258) from fix/tradein-photo-upload-stream-cap into main

tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/trade_in.py

@@ -518,11 +518,19 @@ async def upload_photo(
             status_code=409, detail=f"photo limit reached ({_MAX_PHOTOS_PER_ESTIMATE})"
         )
 
-    content = await file.read()
+    # #2233: читаем тело чанками с жёстким капом, а не await file.read() целиком —
+    # иначе multi-GB аплоад буферизуется в RAM и OOM-killed backend (mem_limit 768m, #2214).
+    # 413 бросается СРАЗУ при превышении, остаток тела запроса НЕ читается.
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total = 0
+    while chunk := await file.read(64 * 1024):
+        total += len(chunk)
+        if total > _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="file too large (max 10 MB)")
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+    content = b"".join(chunks)
     if not content:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="empty file")
-    if len(content) > _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES:
-        raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="file too large (max 10 MB)")
 
     # Sanitize: re-encode through Pillow to drop EXIF, kill polyglot payloads,
     # cap dimensions. Closes finding #6 from 2026-05-24 audit.

tradein-mvp/backend/tests/test_estimate_idor.py

@@ -491,6 +491,69 @@ def test_upload_photo_owner_can_upload(trade_in_app: FastAPI, monkeypatch) -> No
     assert resp.status_code == 200
 
 
+class _InfiniteUploadFile:
+    """UploadFile stub whose async read(size) yields endless 64KB chunks (#2233).
+
+    Simulates a multi-GB stream. Counts read() calls so the test can assert the
+    handler stops reading right after the cap is exceeded instead of draining the
+    whole body into RAM.
+    """
+
+    content_type = "image/png"
+    filename = "huge.png"
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.read_calls = 0
+
+    async def read(self, size: int = -1) -> bytes:
+        self.read_calls += 1
+        return b"\x00" * (64 * 1024)
+
+
+async def test_upload_photo_streams_over_cap_returns_413_without_full_read() -> None:
+    """#2233: a stream larger than 10 MB → 413 raised early, body NOT fully read.
+
+    Acceptance: read() is called only ~(10MB/64KB)+1 times (161), proving the loop
+    bails on the first chunk that pushes total past _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES rather than
+    buffering an unbounded upload (which would OOM the 768m-capped container, #2214).
+    """
+    from uuid import UUID
+
+    from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+    import app.core.auth as auth_mod
+    from app.api.v1.trade_in import _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES, upload_photo
+
+    auth_mod.get_role = lambda _u: "pilot"  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+    # guard SELECT → owner; count SELECT → 0. INSERT must never be reached.
+    db = MagicMock()
+    guard_result = MagicMock()
+    guard_result.fetchone.return_value = SimpleNamespace(created_by="kopylov")
+    count_result = MagicMock()
+    count_result.scalar_one.return_value = 0
+    db.execute.side_effect = [guard_result, count_result]
+
+    upload = _InfiniteUploadFile()
+
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+        await upload_photo(
+            estimate_id=UUID(_ESTIMATE_ID),
+            db=db,
+            file=upload,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            x_authenticated_user="kopylov",
+        )
+
+    assert exc_info.value.status_code == 413
+    expected_reads = _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES // (64 * 1024) + 1  # 161
+    assert upload.read_calls == expected_reads
+    # sanity: bounded, nowhere near infinite
+    assert upload.read_calls < 200
+    # INSERT (3rd execute) never fired — nothing persisted
+    assert db.execute.call_count == 2
+    db.commit.assert_not_called()
+
+
 # ── Derived analytics routes (representative: /houses, /imv-benchmark) ────────
 
 

tradein-mvp/deploy/Caddyfile.tradein-fragment

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@
 handle_path /trade-in/api/* {
     # handle_path вырезает префикс /trade-in перед прокси →
     # FastAPI получает /api/v1/...
+    #
+    # #2233: первый рубеж против OOM на фото-аплоаде — режем тело >12MB на
+    # уровне Caddy (backend капит на 10MB чанково, см. upload_photo). Scoped
+    # ТОЛЬКО на /trade-in/api/* — не трогает фронт/остальной сайт.
+    request_body {
+        max_size 12MB
+    }
     reverse_proxy tradein-backend:8000
 }