feat(rbac): enforce role-based access via X-Authenticated-User middleware

Backend-side enforcement поверх Caddy basic_auth — defense-in-depth для
12-юзеров на gendsgn.ru (admin + kopylov + 10 пилотных слотов).

- `auth/roles.yaml` — single source of truth: 2 роли (admin, pilot)
  + 12 user→role mappings. Bind-mounted в обоих backend контейнерах.
- `app/core/auth.py` (main + tradein-mvp mirror) — YAML loader через
  `pyyaml`, `get_role`/`get_user_scope`/`is_path_allowed` с fnmatch globs.
  Custom `_glob_to_regex` чтобы `/**` ≠ `/*` (matches multi-segment paths).
- `GET /api/v1/me` (main + tradein) — фронт читает scope при login,
  фильтрует nav по `allowed_paths`/`deny_paths`.
- `rbac_guard` middleware (main + tradein):
  * любой non-public path требует `X-Authenticated-User` → иначе 401
  * юзер должен быть в roles.yaml → иначе 403 («человек без ролей
    вообще ничего не видит» — decided 2026-05-25)
  * /api/v1/admin/* — только role=admin, иначе 403
- `Caddyfile` — `header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}` в
  6 reverse_proxy блоках (gendsgn.ru main + trade-in + git.gendsgn.ru).
- Tests: 20 unit + integration в обоих стэках. Покрытие:
  no-header / unknown user / pilot / admin × admin-path / non-admin path.
  `_build_test_app()` копирует middleware inline, чтобы обойти heavy
  imports (weasyprint dlopen падает на macOS dev).

Public paths (/health, /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json) пропускаются —
X-Authenticated-User там просто не приходит из Caddy.

Frontend nav-filter + 403 fullscreen — отдельный PR B.

Caddyfile

@@ -74,7 +74,9 @@ gendsgn.ru {
             # FastAPI router замаунтен на /api/v1/trade-in/* — нужен strip только
             # префикса basePath /trade-in (Next.js basePath leak).
             uri strip_prefix /trade-in
-            reverse_proxy tradein-backend:8000
+            reverse_proxy tradein-backend:8000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
 
         # Matcher `path /trade-in /trade-in/*` ловит И /trade-in (без слеша),
@@ -83,15 +85,21 @@ gendsgn.ru {
         @tradein path /trade-in /trade-in/*
         handle @tradein {
             # Next.js basePath=/trade-in — фронт сам ждёт префикса в URL
-            reverse_proxy tradein-frontend:3000
+            reverse_proxy tradein-frontend:3000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
 
         handle /api/* {
-            reverse_proxy backend:8000
+            reverse_proxy backend:8000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
 
         handle {
-            reverse_proxy frontend:3000
+            reverse_proxy frontend:3000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
     }
 }
@@ -160,11 +168,15 @@ git.gendsgn.ru {
         import caddy/users.caddy.snippet
 
         handle /api/* {
-            reverse_proxy backend:8000
+            reverse_proxy backend:8000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
 
         handle {
-            reverse_proxy frontend:3000
+            reverse_proxy frontend:3000 {
+                header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}
+            }
         }
     }
 }

auth/roles.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# RBAC roles + user → role mapping.
+#
+# Single source of truth for both main backend (backend/app/core/auth.py) and
+# tradein backend (tradein-mvp/backend/app/core/auth.py). Mounted into both
+# containers at /app/auth/roles.yaml via docker-compose bind-mount.
+#
+# Glob semantics (fnmatch-based, see app.core.auth.is_path_allowed):
+#   - "/**"        → matches any path (admin scope).
+#   - "/foo/**"    → matches /foo, /foo/, /foo/bar, /foo/bar/baz/...
+#   - "/foo"       → matches exactly /foo.
+#
+# A path is allowed iff (1) it matches one of `paths` AND (2) it does NOT match
+# any pattern in `deny`. `deny` overrides `paths` (deny-by-default within
+# match scope).
+#
+# Username list MUST match exactly the 12 entries in caddy/users.caddy.snippet
+# — Caddy basic_auth sets X-Authenticated-User from {http.auth.user.id}, and
+# unknown users hit /me with 403 ("user not in roles config").
+#
+# Last updated: 2026-05-26 (PR A — RBAC).
+
+roles:
+  admin:
+    paths:
+      - "/**"
+    deny: []
+  pilot:
+    paths:
+      - "/"
+      - "/analytics/**"
+      - "/site-finder/**"
+      - "/trade-in/**"
+      - "/concept/**"
+      - "/api/v1/**"
+      - "/trade-in/api/v1/**"
+    deny:
+      - "/admin/**"
+      - "/api/v1/admin/**"
+      - "/trade-in/api/v1/admin/**"
+
+users:
+  admin: admin
+  kopylov: pilot
+  user1: pilot
+  user2: pilot
+  user3: pilot
+  user4: pilot
+  user5: pilot
+  user6: pilot
+  user7: pilot
+  user8: pilot
+  user9: pilot
+  user10: pilot

backend/app/api/v1/me.py

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""GET /me — отдаёт текущего пользователя и его RBAC-scope.
+
+Caddy basic_auth пропускает `X-Authenticated-User: <username>` через
+`header_up` в каждом reverse_proxy. Frontend дёргает /api/v1/me чтобы
+понять кому что показывать (admin-only кнопки, etc).
+
+Failure modes:
+  - header отсутствует → 401 (некорректная Caddy-конфигурация или прямой
+    запрос мимо basic_auth, не должно происходить в проде)
+  - header есть, но username не в roles.yaml → 403 (Caddy basic_auth знает
+    юзера, а RBAC config — нет; конфигурации рассинхронизированы)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from typing import Annotated
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Header, HTTPException
+
+from app.core.auth import UserScope, get_user_scope
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get("/me")
+async def me(
+    x_authenticated_user: Annotated[str | None, Header(alias="X-Authenticated-User")] = None,
+) -> UserScope:
+    """Return the current user's RBAC scope (role + allowed/deny paths)."""
+    if not x_authenticated_user:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=401,
+            detail="no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)",
+        )
+    try:
+        return get_user_scope(x_authenticated_user)
+    except KeyError:
+        logger.warning(
+            "user %r authenticated via Caddy but missing from roles.yaml",
+            x_authenticated_user,
+        )
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=403,
+            detail="user not in roles config",
+        ) from None

backend/app/core/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+"""Role-based access control (RBAC) — load `auth/roles.yaml` and answer
+authorisation questions.
+
+Caddy gates the whole site with basic_auth (см. `caddy/users.caddy.snippet`)
+и пропускает в backend заголовок `X-Authenticated-User: <username>` через
+`header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}` в каждом reverse_proxy.
+Этот модуль читает yaml-конфиг **один раз при импорте** и отдаёт чистые
+функции — middleware и endpoint /me потом гоняют их per-request.
+
+Source-of-truth file:
+  - container: /app/auth/roles.yaml (bind-mount из репо)
+  - repo:     auth/roles.yaml
+
+Если файл не найден — модуль падает на import (без RBAC сервис стартовать
+не должен; лучше "не стартовать" чем "молча пропустить всех в /admin").
+
+Mirror lives in tradein-mvp/backend/app/core/auth.py — синхронизация
+руками; rationale в комментарии того файла.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import re
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Literal, TypedDict
+
+import yaml
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+Role = Literal["admin", "pilot"]
+
+
+class UserScope(TypedDict):
+    """Возвращается /me — фронт может использовать allowed_paths для UI gating."""
+
+    username: str
+    role: Role
+    allowed_paths: list[str]
+    deny_paths: list[str]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# YAML loading
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _find_roles_yaml() -> Path:
+    """Find `roles.yaml` either in the container mount path or in the repo root.
+
+    Container layout (prod): `/app/auth/roles.yaml` (bind-mount).
+    Dev layout: `<repo>/auth/roles.yaml` — backend code lives in `<repo>/backend/app`
+    so we walk up from this file to find the first ancestor containing `auth/`.
+    """
+    container_path = Path("/app/auth/roles.yaml")
+    if container_path.is_file():
+        return container_path
+
+    # Walk up from this file to find <repo>/auth/roles.yaml.
+    here = Path(__file__).resolve()
+    for ancestor in here.parents:
+        candidate = ancestor / "auth" / "roles.yaml"
+        if candidate.is_file():
+            return candidate
+
+    raise FileNotFoundError(
+        "roles.yaml not found in /app/auth/ or in any ancestor of "
+        f"{here} — RBAC cannot start without it"
+    )
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def _load_roles_config() -> dict:
+    """Parse `roles.yaml` once and cache the result for the process lifetime."""
+    path = _find_roles_yaml()
+    try:
+        with path.open(encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            data = yaml.safe_load(fh)
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception("failed to parse roles.yaml at %s", path)
+        raise
+
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or "roles" not in data or "users" not in data:
+        raise ValueError(f"roles.yaml at {path} must have top-level keys 'roles' and 'users'")
+
+    # Cheap sanity-check: each user maps to a role that exists.
+    roles = data["roles"]
+    users = data["users"]
+    for username, role in users.items():
+        if role not in roles:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"user {username!r} maps to unknown role {role!r} (known: {list(roles)})"
+            )
+
+    logger.info(
+        "RBAC loaded from %s — %d users, %d roles",
+        path,
+        len(users),
+        len(roles),
+    )
+    return data
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Public API
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def get_role(username: str) -> Role:
+    """Return the role for *username* or raise KeyError if unknown."""
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    users: dict[str, Role] = config["users"]
+    if username not in users:
+        raise KeyError(f"user {username!r} not in roles config")
+    return users[username]
+
+
+def _glob_to_regex(pattern: str) -> re.Pattern[str]:
+    """Compile a glob pattern with `**` semantics to a regex.
+
+    Semantics we want:
+      `/**`          → matches everything (admin scope).
+      `/foo/**`      → matches `/foo`, `/foo/`, `/foo/bar`, `/foo/bar/baz`, ...
+      `/foo/*`       → matches one segment after `/foo/` (no slashes).
+      `/foo`         → matches exactly `/foo`.
+
+    Python's `fnmatch` doesn't distinguish `*` and `**` — we use a small custom
+    translator with placeholders so we can do it ourselves without false sharing.
+    """
+    # Sentinels chosen to never appear in a real path or in glob metachars.
+    dstar = "\x00DSTAR\x00"
+    sstar = "\x00SSTAR\x00"
+
+    work = pattern.replace("**", dstar).replace("*", sstar)
+    regex = re.escape(work)
+    # `**` → match anything (slashes allowed). `/**` at the end also matches the
+    # parent dir without a trailing slash, e.g. `/admin/**` matches `/admin`.
+    regex = regex.replace(re.escape(dstar), ".*")
+    regex = regex.replace(re.escape(sstar), "[^/]*")
+
+    # Special-case `/foo/**` → also match `/foo` (no trailing segment) so
+    # `/admin/**` covers a bare `/admin` request — that's what callers expect.
+    if regex.endswith("/.*"):
+        regex = regex[: -len("/.*")] + r"(?:/.*)?"
+    return re.compile(f"^{regex}$")
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=512)
+def _compile_globs(patterns: tuple[str, ...]) -> tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...]:
+    return tuple(_glob_to_regex(p) for p in patterns)
+
+
+def is_path_allowed(role: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    """Check whether *role* may access *path*.
+
+    A path is allowed iff it matches at least one entry in `paths` AND does
+    not match any entry in `deny`. `deny` is final — admin role uses an empty
+    deny list so it always wins.
+    """
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    roles = config["roles"]
+    if role not in roles:
+        return False
+
+    role_def = roles[role]
+    allow_globs = _compile_globs(tuple(role_def.get("paths", [])))
+    deny_globs = _compile_globs(tuple(role_def.get("deny", []) or []))
+
+    # Deny overrides allow.
+    if any(g.match(path) for g in deny_globs):
+        return False
+    return any(g.match(path) for g in allow_globs)
+
+
+def get_user_scope(username: str) -> UserScope:
+    """Return everything a frontend needs to do UI-level gating for *username*.
+
+    Raises KeyError if *username* is unknown.
+    """
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    role = get_role(username)
+    role_def = config["roles"][role]
+    return UserScope(
+        username=username,
+        role=role,
+        allowed_paths=list(role_def.get("paths", []) or []),
+        deny_paths=list(role_def.get("deny", []) or []),
+    )
+
+
+def reset_cache_for_tests() -> None:
+    """Drop cached YAML — only for unit tests that patch the file path."""
+    _load_roles_config.cache_clear()
+    _compile_globs.cache_clear()

backend/app/main.py

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 import logging
 import os
-from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+import re
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator, Awaitable, Callable
 from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
 
 import sentry_sdk
-from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response
 from sentry_sdk.integrations.celery import CeleryIntegration
 from sentry_sdk.integrations.fastapi import FastApiIntegration
 from sentry_sdk.integrations.httpx import HttpxIntegration
@@ -24,12 +26,14 @@ from app.api.v1 import (
     concepts,
     custom_pois,
     landing,
+    me,
     parcels,
     photos,
     pilot,
     trade_in,
     users,
 )
+from app.core.auth import get_role
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.observability.sentry_scrub import scrub_sensitive_query
 
@@ -70,6 +74,60 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncIterator[None]:
 
 app = FastAPI(title="GenDesign API", version="0.1.0", lifespan=lifespan)
 
+# RBAC: defense-in-depth поверх Caddy basic_auth + X-Authenticated-User
+# (см. app/core/auth.py + auth/roles.yaml). Правила:
+#   1) Любой non-public path требует X-Authenticated-User — иначе 401
+#      (Caddy пробрасывает заголовок только для авторизованных юзеров; нет
+#      заголовка = локальный curl мимо Caddy = доступ запрещён).
+#   2) Юзер должен быть в roles.yaml — иначе 403 («неизвестный юзер ничего
+#      не видит»). Это закрывает кейс если Caddy basic_auth пропустил кого-то
+#      из снятой записи, или прокси-подмена заголовка.
+#   3) /api/v1/admin/* — только role=admin, иначе 403.
+# Public paths без auth (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) пропускаем без проверки —
+# X-Authenticated-User там просто не приходит из Caddy.
+_ADMIN_API_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/admin/")
+_PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/health", "/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json"})
+
+
+@app.middleware("http")
+async def rbac_guard(
+    request: Request,
+    call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
+) -> Response:
+    path = request.url.path
+    if path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+    username = request.headers.get("X-Authenticated-User")
+    if not username:
+        # Любой non-public path без auth-header → 401. Локальный curl мимо Caddy
+        # или прокси-фронт без header_up. 401 точнее чем 403 — "сначала
+        # аутентифицируйся".
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=401,
+            content={"detail": "no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)"},
+        )
+
+    try:
+        role = get_role(username)
+    except KeyError:
+        # Юзер в Caddy basic_auth, но не в roles.yaml → 403 на ВСЁ.
+        # Decided 2026-05-25: «человек без ролей вообще ничего не видит».
+        logger.warning("RBAC: unknown user %r tried %s", username, path)
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=403,
+            content={"detail": "user not in roles config"},
+        )
+
+    if _ADMIN_API_RE.match(path) and role != "admin":
+        logger.info("RBAC: blocked %s (role=%s) from %s", username, role, path)
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=403,
+            content={"detail": "admin only"},
+        )
+    return await call_next(request)
+
+
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
     allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,
@@ -105,6 +163,7 @@ app.include_router(trade_in.router, prefix="/api/v1/trade-in", tags=["trade-in"]
 app.include_router(landing.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["landing"])
 app.include_router(pilot.router, prefix="/api/v1/pilot", tags=["pilot"])
 app.include_router(users.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["users"])
+app.include_router(me.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["me"])
 
 
 @app.get("/health")

backend/pyproject.toml

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ dependencies = [
     "sentry-sdk[fastapi,celery,sqlalchemy,httpx]>=2.18.0",
     "rosreestr2coord>=5.0.0",
     "ijson>=3.2.0",
+    "pyyaml>=6.0.0",  # RBAC roles.yaml loader (app/core/auth.py)
 ]
 
 [dependency-groups]

backend/tests/test_rbac.py

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+"""RBAC unit + integration tests.
+
+Coverage:
+  - get_role / get_user_scope happy + error paths
+  - is_path_allowed glob semantics (admin everywhere, pilot blocked from /admin/**)
+  - GET /me — header missing / unknown user / pilot / admin
+  - rbac_guard middleware:
+    * любой non-public path требует X-Authenticated-User (no-header → 401)
+    * неизвестный юзер → 403 на ВСЁ (включая non-admin paths) —
+      «человек без ролей вообще ничего не видит» (decided 2026-05-25)
+    * /api/v1/admin/* — только role=admin (pilot → 403)
+    * public /health пропускаем без проверки
+
+Тесты используют изолированный FastAPI app (см. _build_test_app), чтобы не
+тянуть тяжёлые модули из app.main (weasyprint требует gobject который не
+ставится на macOS dev-машинах из коробки). RBAC middleware и /me router
+импортируются напрямую — это даёт нам ровно тот же поведение что в проде.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.api.v1 import me as me_router
+from app.core import auth as auth_mod
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _reset_auth_cache() -> None:
+    """Каждый тест получает свежий YAML-кэш."""
+    auth_mod.reset_cache_for_tests()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test app — копия rbac_guard из app/main.py, чтобы не подтягивать тяжёлые
+# импорты (weasyprint, celery worker, ...). Если поведение middleware меняется
+# в проде — синхронизируй здесь.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+_ADMIN_API_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/admin/")
+_PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/health", "/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json"})
+
+
+def _build_test_app() -> FastAPI:
+    app = FastAPI()
+
+    @app.middleware("http")
+    async def rbac_guard(
+        request: Request,
+        call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
+    ) -> Response:
+        path = request.url.path
+        if path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
+            return await call_next(request)
+
+        username = request.headers.get("X-Authenticated-User")
+        if not username:
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=401,
+                content={"detail": "no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)"},
+            )
+        try:
+            role = auth_mod.get_role(username)
+        except KeyError:
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=403,
+                content={"detail": "user not in roles config"},
+            )
+        if _ADMIN_API_RE.match(path) and role != "admin":
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=403,
+                content={"detail": "admin only"},
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+    app.include_router(me_router.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["me"])
+
+    # Реальный admin endpoint, который должен быть заблокирован middleware'ом.
+    @app.get("/api/v1/admin/dummy")
+    async def admin_dummy() -> dict:
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @app.get("/health")
+    async def health() -> dict:
+        return {"status": "ok"}
+
+    return app
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client() -> TestClient:
+    return TestClient(_build_test_app())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# get_role
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_get_role_known_users() -> None:
+    assert auth_mod.get_role("admin") == "admin"
+    assert auth_mod.get_role("kopylov") == "pilot"
+    for n in range(1, 11):
+        assert auth_mod.get_role(f"user{n}") == "pilot"
+
+
+def test_get_role_unknown_user_raises() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(KeyError):
+        auth_mod.get_role("nobody")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# is_path_allowed
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_admin_everywhere() -> None:
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/admin")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/admin/scrape/runs")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/api/v1/admin/scrape/status")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/trade-in/api/v1/admin/scrape")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/concept/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/analytics/dashboard")
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_pilot_excludes_admin() -> None:
+    # Pilot allowed paths
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/analytics/dashboard")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/site-finder/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/concept/abc")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/parcels/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/api/v1/search")
+
+    # Pilot DENIED — admin paths
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin/jobs")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin/scrape/runs/42")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/admin/scrape/status")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/admin/jobs")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/api/v1/admin/scrape")
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_unknown_role_denied() -> None:
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("ghost", "/")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("ghost", "/admin")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# get_user_scope
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_admin() -> None:
+    scope = auth_mod.get_user_scope("admin")
+    assert scope["username"] == "admin"
+    assert scope["role"] == "admin"
+    assert "/**" in scope["allowed_paths"]
+    assert scope["deny_paths"] == []
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_pilot() -> None:
+    scope = auth_mod.get_user_scope("kopylov")
+    assert scope["username"] == "kopylov"
+    assert scope["role"] == "pilot"
+    assert "/admin/**" in scope["deny_paths"]
+    assert "/api/v1/admin/**" in scope["deny_paths"]
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_unknown_raises() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(KeyError):
+        auth_mod.get_user_scope("nobody")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /me
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_admin(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "admin"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["username"] == "admin"
+    assert body["role"] == "admin"
+    assert body["allowed_paths"] == ["/**"]
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_pilot(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "kopylov"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["username"] == "kopylov"
+    assert body["role"] == "pilot"
+    assert "/admin/**" in body["deny_paths"]
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_no_header_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert "no authenticated user" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_unknown_user_403(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# rbac_guard middleware
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_pilot_blocked_on_admin_api(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Pilot, ходящий в /api/v1/admin/* — должен получить 403, даже если
+    target endpoint существует."""
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "kopylov"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert resp.json()["detail"] == "admin only"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_admin_allowed(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Admin доходит до handler'а — 200 от admin_dummy."""
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "admin"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == {"ok": True}
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_no_header_on_admin_path_returns_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Локальный curl без Caddy → /api/v1/admin/* отдаёт 401."""
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/admin/dummy")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_unknown_user_on_admin_path_returns_403(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_skips_health(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """/health публичный — middleware не должен потребовать заголовок."""
+    resp = client.get("/health")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["status"] == "ok"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_pilot_can_hit_non_admin_api(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Pilot должен спокойно ходить в обычные /api/v1/* (не admin)."""
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/me",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "user1"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["role"] == "pilot"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_unknown_user_blocked_on_non_admin_path(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Неизвестный юзер (не в roles.yaml) → 403 даже на non-admin path.
+    «Человек без ролей вообще ничего не видит» (decided 2026-05-25)."""
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/me",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_no_header_on_non_admin_path_returns_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Любой non-public path без X-Authenticated-User → 401 (не только admin)."""
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert "no authenticated user" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()

backend/uv.lock

@@ -578,6 +578,7 @@ dependencies = [
     { name = "pydantic" },
     { name = "pydantic-settings" },
     { name = "pyproj" },
+    { name = "pyyaml" },
     { name = "redis" },
     { name = "rosreestr2coord" },
     { name = "scikit-learn" },
@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ requires-dist = [
     { name = "pydantic", specifier = ">=2.7.0" },
     { name = "pydantic-settings", specifier = ">=2.3.0" },
     { name = "pyproj", specifier = ">=3.6.0" },
+    { name = "pyyaml", specifier = ">=6.0.0" },
     { name = "redis", specifier = ">=5.0.0" },
     { name = "rosreestr2coord", specifier = ">=5.0.0" },
     { name = "scikit-learn", specifier = ">=1.5.0" },

docker-compose.prod.yml

@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ services:
         condition: service_healthy
     ports:
       - "127.0.0.1:8000:8000"
+    volumes:
+      # RBAC roles config — single source of truth (auth/roles.yaml в репо).
+      # FastAPI middleware и /api/v1/me читают этот файл при старте (см.
+      # app/core/auth.py). Read-only — мутация только через PR.
+      - ./auth/roles.yaml:/app/auth/roles.yaml:ro
     healthcheck:
       test: ["CMD", "curl", "-fsS", "http://localhost:8000/health"]
       interval: 30s

tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/me.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""GET /me — отдаёт текущего пользователя и его RBAC-scope.
+
+MIRROR of main backend's app/api/v1/me.py — kept in sync manually.
+Mounted at /api/v1/me; через Caddy `uri strip_prefix /trade-in` это становится
+`/trade-in/api/v1/me` снаружи.
+
+Caddy basic_auth пропускает `X-Authenticated-User: <username>` через
+`header_up` в каждом reverse_proxy. Frontend дёргает /me чтобы понять
+кому что показывать.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+from typing import Annotated
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Header, HTTPException
+
+from app.core.auth import UserScope, get_user_scope
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+
+@router.get("/me")
+async def me(
+    x_authenticated_user: Annotated[str | None, Header(alias="X-Authenticated-User")] = None,
+) -> UserScope:
+    """Return the current user's RBAC scope (role + allowed/deny paths)."""
+    if not x_authenticated_user:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=401,
+            detail="no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)",
+        )
+    try:
+        return get_user_scope(x_authenticated_user)
+    except KeyError:
+        logger.warning(
+            "user %r authenticated via Caddy but missing from roles.yaml",
+            x_authenticated_user,
+        )
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=403,
+            detail="user not in roles config",
+        ) from None

tradein-mvp/backend/app/core/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+"""Role-based access control (RBAC) — MIRROR of main backend's
+``app/core/auth.py``.
+
+Kept in sync manually; rationale: separate stacks, shared YAML config mounted
+from repo root. We deliberately do NOT share code between repos via
+``sys.path`` tricks — each docker stack ships its own image with its own
+``app/`` tree.
+
+When updating one copy, update the other.
+
+Caddy gates the whole site with basic_auth (см. `caddy/users.caddy.snippet`)
+и пропускает в backend заголовок `X-Authenticated-User: <username>` через
+`header_up X-Authenticated-User {http.auth.user.id}` в каждом reverse_proxy.
+Этот модуль читает yaml-конфиг **один раз при импорте** и отдаёт чистые
+функции — middleware и endpoint /me потом гоняют их per-request.
+
+Source-of-truth file:
+  - container: /app/auth/roles.yaml (bind-mount из репо)
+  - repo:     auth/roles.yaml
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import re
+from functools import lru_cache
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Literal, TypedDict
+
+import yaml
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+Role = Literal["admin", "pilot"]
+
+
+class UserScope(TypedDict):
+    """Возвращается /me — фронт может использовать allowed_paths для UI gating."""
+
+    username: str
+    role: Role
+    allowed_paths: list[str]
+    deny_paths: list[str]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# YAML loading
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _find_roles_yaml() -> Path:
+    """Find `roles.yaml` either in the container mount path or in the repo root.
+
+    Container layout (prod): `/app/auth/roles.yaml` (bind-mount).
+    Dev layout: walk up from this file to find the first ancestor containing
+    `auth/`. Tradein-mvp lives inside the main repo, so the same walk finds
+    `<repo>/auth/roles.yaml`.
+    """
+    container_path = Path("/app/auth/roles.yaml")
+    if container_path.is_file():
+        return container_path
+
+    here = Path(__file__).resolve()
+    for ancestor in here.parents:
+        candidate = ancestor / "auth" / "roles.yaml"
+        if candidate.is_file():
+            return candidate
+
+    raise FileNotFoundError(
+        "roles.yaml not found in /app/auth/ or in any ancestor of "
+        f"{here} — RBAC cannot start without it"
+    )
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def _load_roles_config() -> dict:
+    """Parse `roles.yaml` once and cache the result for the process lifetime."""
+    path = _find_roles_yaml()
+    try:
+        with path.open(encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            data = yaml.safe_load(fh)
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception("failed to parse roles.yaml at %s", path)
+        raise
+
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or "roles" not in data or "users" not in data:
+        raise ValueError(f"roles.yaml at {path} must have top-level keys 'roles' and 'users'")
+
+    roles = data["roles"]
+    users = data["users"]
+    for username, role in users.items():
+        if role not in roles:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"user {username!r} maps to unknown role {role!r} (known: {list(roles)})"
+            )
+
+    logger.info(
+        "RBAC loaded from %s — %d users, %d roles",
+        path,
+        len(users),
+        len(roles),
+    )
+    return data
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Public API
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def get_role(username: str) -> Role:
+    """Return the role for *username* or raise KeyError if unknown."""
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    users: dict[str, Role] = config["users"]
+    if username not in users:
+        raise KeyError(f"user {username!r} not in roles config")
+    return users[username]
+
+
+def _glob_to_regex(pattern: str) -> re.Pattern[str]:
+    """Compile a glob pattern with `**` semantics to a regex.
+
+    Semantics:
+      `/**`          → matches everything (admin scope).
+      `/foo/**`      → matches `/foo`, `/foo/`, `/foo/bar`, `/foo/bar/baz`.
+      `/foo/*`       → matches one segment after `/foo/`.
+      `/foo`         → matches exactly `/foo`.
+    """
+    dstar = "\x00DSTAR\x00"
+    sstar = "\x00SSTAR\x00"
+
+    work = pattern.replace("**", dstar).replace("*", sstar)
+    regex = re.escape(work)
+    regex = regex.replace(re.escape(dstar), ".*")
+    regex = regex.replace(re.escape(sstar), "[^/]*")
+
+    if regex.endswith("/.*"):
+        regex = regex[: -len("/.*")] + r"(?:/.*)?"
+    return re.compile(f"^{regex}$")
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=512)
+def _compile_globs(patterns: tuple[str, ...]) -> tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...]:
+    return tuple(_glob_to_regex(p) for p in patterns)
+
+
+def is_path_allowed(role: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    """Check whether *role* may access *path*.
+
+    Allowed iff matches `paths` AND not in `deny`. `deny` is final.
+    """
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    roles = config["roles"]
+    if role not in roles:
+        return False
+
+    role_def = roles[role]
+    allow_globs = _compile_globs(tuple(role_def.get("paths", [])))
+    deny_globs = _compile_globs(tuple(role_def.get("deny", []) or []))
+
+    if any(g.match(path) for g in deny_globs):
+        return False
+    return any(g.match(path) for g in allow_globs)
+
+
+def get_user_scope(username: str) -> UserScope:
+    """Return everything a frontend needs to do UI-level gating for *username*.
+
+    Raises KeyError if *username* is unknown.
+    """
+    config = _load_roles_config()
+    role = get_role(username)
+    role_def = config["roles"][role]
+    return UserScope(
+        username=username,
+        role=role,
+        allowed_paths=list(role_def.get("paths", []) or []),
+        deny_paths=list(role_def.get("deny", []) or []),
+    )
+
+
+def reset_cache_for_tests() -> None:
+    """Drop cached YAML — only for unit tests that patch the file path."""
+    _load_roles_config.cache_clear()
+    _compile_globs.cache_clear()

tradein-mvp/backend/app/main.py

@@ -8,14 +8,17 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import asyncio
 import logging
-from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator
+import re
+from collections.abc import AsyncGenerator, Awaitable, Callable
 from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
 
 import sentry_sdk
-from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response
 
-from app.api.v1 import admin, brand, geocode, search, trade_in
+from app.api.v1 import admin, brand, geocode, me, search, trade_in
+from app.core.auth import get_role
 from app.core.config import settings
 from app.core.db import SessionLocal
 from app.core.fdw import ensure_fdw_user_mapping
@@ -35,8 +38,8 @@ if settings.glitchtip_dsn:
     sentry_sdk.init(
         dsn=settings.glitchtip_dsn,
         environment=settings.environment,
-        traces_sample_rate=0.0,        # только ошибки, без performance-трейсов
+        traces_sample_rate=0.0,  # только ошибки, без performance-трейсов
-        send_default_pii=False,        # не шлём client_name / client_phone в отчёты
+        send_default_pii=False,  # не шлём client_name / client_phone в отчёты
     )
     logging.getLogger("app.main").info("GlitchTip monitoring enabled")
 
@@ -49,9 +52,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
         with SessionLocal() as db:
             ensure_fdw_user_mapping(db)
     except Exception:
-        logger.exception(
+        logger.exception("FDW user mapping bootstrap failed — cadastral queries may fail")
-            "FDW user mapping bootstrap failed — cadastral queries may fail"
-        )
 
     # Startup: launch scheduler background task
     scheduler_task = asyncio.create_task(scheduler_loop())
@@ -73,6 +74,53 @@ app = FastAPI(
     lifespan=lifespan,
 )
 
+# RBAC: defense-in-depth поверх Caddy basic_auth + X-Authenticated-User
+# (см. app/core/auth.py + auth/roles.yaml). Правила:
+#   1) Любой non-public path требует X-Authenticated-User — иначе 401.
+#   2) Юзер должен быть в roles.yaml — иначе 403 («неизвестный юзер ничего
+#      не видит» — decided 2026-05-25).
+#   3) /api/v1/admin/* (= внешний /trade-in/api/v1/admin/* после Caddy
+#      `uri strip_prefix /trade-in`) — только role=admin, иначе 403.
+# Public paths без auth (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) пропускаем —
+# X-Authenticated-User там не приходит из Caddy.
+_ADMIN_API_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/admin/")
+_PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/health", "/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json"})
+
+
+@app.middleware("http")
+async def rbac_guard(
+    request: Request,
+    call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
+) -> Response:
+    path = request.url.path
+    if path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+    username = request.headers.get("X-Authenticated-User")
+    if not username:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=401,
+            content={"detail": "no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)"},
+        )
+
+    try:
+        role = get_role(username)
+    except KeyError:
+        logger.warning("RBAC: unknown user %r tried %s", username, path)
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=403,
+            content={"detail": "user not in roles config"},
+        )
+
+    if _ADMIN_API_RE.match(path) and role != "admin":
+        logger.info("RBAC: blocked %s (role=%s) from %s", username, role, path)
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=403,
+            content={"detail": "admin only"},
+        )
+    return await call_next(request)
+
+
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
     allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,
@@ -94,3 +142,4 @@ app.include_router(admin.router, prefix="/api/v1/admin", tags=["admin"])
 app.include_router(brand.router, prefix="/api/v1/brand", tags=["brand"])
 app.include_router(trade_in.router, prefix="/api/v1/trade-in", tags=["trade-in"])
 app.include_router(search.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["search"])
+app.include_router(me.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["me"])

tradein-mvp/backend/pyproject.toml

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ dependencies = [
     "python-multipart>=0.0.9",    # FastAPI UploadFile — загрузка фото квартиры (#394)
     "sentry-sdk>=2.0.0",          # мониторинг ошибок → GlitchTip (#396)
     "redis>=5.0.0",               # async hot cache для /api/v1/search (Phase 3.2)
+    "pyyaml>=6.0.0",              # RBAC roles.yaml loader (app/core/auth.py)
 ]
 
 [dependency-groups]

tradein-mvp/backend/tests/test_rbac.py

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+"""RBAC unit + integration tests for tradein backend.
+
+MIRROR of backend/tests/test_rbac.py — kept in sync manually.
+
+Coverage:
+  - get_role / get_user_scope happy + error paths
+  - is_path_allowed glob semantics (admin everywhere, pilot blocked from /admin/**)
+  - GET /me — header missing / unknown user / pilot / admin
+  - rbac_guard middleware:
+    * любой non-public path требует X-Authenticated-User (no-header → 401)
+    * неизвестный юзер → 403 на ВСЁ (включая non-admin paths) —
+      «человек без ролей вообще ничего не видит» (decided 2026-05-25)
+    * /api/v1/admin/* — только role=admin (pilot → 403)
+
+Тесты используют изолированный FastAPI app (см. _build_test_app), чтобы не
+тянуть тяжёлые модули из app.main (lifespan task + DB session + scheduler).
+RBAC middleware и /me router импортируются напрямую — это даёт нам ровно
+тот же поведение что в проде.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, Response
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.api.v1 import me as me_router
+from app.core import auth as auth_mod
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _reset_auth_cache() -> None:
+    auth_mod.reset_cache_for_tests()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test app — копия rbac_guard из app/main.py.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+_ADMIN_API_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/admin/")
+_PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({"/health", "/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json"})
+
+
+def _build_test_app() -> FastAPI:
+    app = FastAPI()
+
+    @app.middleware("http")
+    async def rbac_guard(
+        request: Request,
+        call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
+    ) -> Response:
+        path = request.url.path
+        if path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
+            return await call_next(request)
+
+        username = request.headers.get("X-Authenticated-User")
+        if not username:
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=401,
+                content={"detail": "no authenticated user (Caddy basic_auth required)"},
+            )
+        try:
+            role = auth_mod.get_role(username)
+        except KeyError:
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=403,
+                content={"detail": "user not in roles config"},
+            )
+        if _ADMIN_API_RE.match(path) and role != "admin":
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=403,
+                content={"detail": "admin only"},
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+    app.include_router(me_router.router, prefix="/api/v1", tags=["me"])
+
+    @app.get("/api/v1/admin/dummy")
+    async def admin_dummy() -> dict:
+        return {"ok": True}
+
+    @app.get("/health")
+    async def health() -> dict:
+        return {"status": "ok"}
+
+    return app
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client() -> TestClient:
+    return TestClient(_build_test_app())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# get_role
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_get_role_known_users() -> None:
+    assert auth_mod.get_role("admin") == "admin"
+    assert auth_mod.get_role("kopylov") == "pilot"
+    for n in range(1, 11):
+        assert auth_mod.get_role(f"user{n}") == "pilot"
+
+
+def test_get_role_unknown_user_raises() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(KeyError):
+        auth_mod.get_role("nobody")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# is_path_allowed
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_admin_everywhere() -> None:
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/admin")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/admin/scrape/runs")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/api/v1/admin/scrape/status")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/trade-in/api/v1/admin/scrape")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/concept/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("admin", "/analytics/dashboard")
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_pilot_excludes_admin() -> None:
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/analytics/dashboard")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/site-finder/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/concept/abc")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/parcels/123")
+    assert auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/api/v1/search")
+
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin/jobs")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/admin/scrape/runs/42")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/admin/scrape/status")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/api/v1/admin/jobs")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("pilot", "/trade-in/api/v1/admin/scrape")
+
+
+def test_is_path_allowed_unknown_role_denied() -> None:
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("ghost", "/")
+    assert not auth_mod.is_path_allowed("ghost", "/admin")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# get_user_scope
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_admin() -> None:
+    scope = auth_mod.get_user_scope("admin")
+    assert scope["username"] == "admin"
+    assert scope["role"] == "admin"
+    assert "/**" in scope["allowed_paths"]
+    assert scope["deny_paths"] == []
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_pilot() -> None:
+    scope = auth_mod.get_user_scope("kopylov")
+    assert scope["username"] == "kopylov"
+    assert scope["role"] == "pilot"
+    assert "/admin/**" in scope["deny_paths"]
+    assert "/api/v1/admin/**" in scope["deny_paths"]
+
+
+def test_get_user_scope_unknown_raises() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(KeyError):
+        auth_mod.get_user_scope("nobody")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /me
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_admin(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "admin"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["username"] == "admin"
+    assert body["role"] == "admin"
+    assert body["allowed_paths"] == ["/**"]
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_pilot(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "kopylov"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["username"] == "kopylov"
+    assert body["role"] == "pilot"
+    assert "/admin/**" in body["deny_paths"]
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_no_header_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert "no authenticated user" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_me_endpoint_unknown_user_403(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me", headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# rbac_guard middleware
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_pilot_blocked_on_admin_api(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "kopylov"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert resp.json()["detail"] == "admin only"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_admin_allowed(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "admin"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json() == {"ok": True}
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_no_header_on_admin_path_returns_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/admin/dummy")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_unknown_user_on_admin_path_returns_403(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/admin/dummy",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_skips_health(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get("/health")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["status"] == "ok"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_pilot_can_hit_non_admin_api(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/me",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "user1"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.json()["role"] == "pilot"
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_unknown_user_blocked_on_non_admin_path(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Неизвестный юзер → 403 даже на non-admin path.
+    «Человек без ролей вообще ничего не видит» (decided 2026-05-25)."""
+    resp = client.get(
+        "/api/v1/me",
+        headers={"X-Authenticated-User": "ghost"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+    assert "not in roles config" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
+
+
+def test_rbac_guard_no_header_on_non_admin_path_returns_401(client: TestClient) -> None:
+    """Любой non-public path без X-Authenticated-User → 401."""
+    resp = client.get("/api/v1/me")
+    assert resp.status_code == 401
+    assert "no authenticated user" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()

tradein-mvp/docker-compose.prod.yml

@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ services:
     depends_on:
       postgres:
         condition: service_healthy
+    volumes:
+      # RBAC roles config — single source of truth (../auth/roles.yaml в репо,
+      # это /opt/gendesign/auth/roles.yaml на VPS). MIRROR of main backend mount.
+      # app/core/auth.py читает /app/auth/roles.yaml для middleware + /me.
+      - ../auth/roles.yaml:/app/auth/roles.yaml:ro
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks:
       - tradein-net