diff --git a/tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/trade_in.py b/tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/trade_in.py
index f7a33939..3014e1f6 100644
--- a/tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/trade_in.py
+++ b/tradein-mvp/backend/app/api/v1/trade_in.py
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from app.schemas.trade_in import (
     TradeInEstimateInput,
 )
 from app.services.exporters.trade_in_pdf import generate_trade_in_pdf
+from app.services.image_sanitizer import ImageSanitizationError, sanitize_image
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -479,6 +480,13 @@ async def upload_photo(
     if len(content) > _MAX_PHOTO_BYTES:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="file too large (max 10 MB)")
 
+    # Sanitize: re-encode through Pillow to drop EXIF, kill polyglot payloads,
+    # cap dimensions. Closes finding #6 from 2026-05-24 audit.
+    try:
+        sanitized_bytes, sanitized_ctype = sanitize_image(content)
+    except ImageSanitizationError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e)) from e
+
     row = db.execute(
         text(
             """
@@ -491,14 +499,15 @@ async def upload_photo(
         {
             "eid": str(estimate_id),
             "fn": file.filename,
-            "ct": ctype,
-            "content": content,
-            "sz": len(content),
+            "ct": sanitized_ctype,
+            "content": sanitized_bytes,
+            "sz": len(sanitized_bytes),
         },
     ).mappings().fetchone()
     db.commit()
     logger.info(
-        "photo uploaded: estimate=%s photo=%s size=%d", estimate_id, row["id"], len(content)
+        "photo uploaded: estimate=%s photo=%s orig_size=%d sanitized_size=%d ctype=%s",
+        estimate_id, row["id"], len(content), len(sanitized_bytes), sanitized_ctype,
     )
     return PhotoMeta(**row)
 
diff --git a/tradein-mvp/backend/app/services/image_sanitizer.py b/tradein-mvp/backend/app/services/image_sanitizer.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f2df5841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tradein-mvp/backend/app/services/image_sanitizer.py
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+"""Image sanitization for user-uploaded photos.
+
+Re-encodes inbound images through Pillow to:
+  - strip EXIF (GPS lat/lon, device fingerprint, owner metadata)
+  - normalize byte stream (a polyglot JPEG with appended payload survives MIME check
+    but is dropped on re-encode — only the actual image survives)
+  - enforce max dimension (defend against pixel-flood DoS in downstream renders)
+  - produce uniform JPEG output (smaller storage; no transparency support needed
+    for apartment photos)
+
+Closes finding #6 from 2026-05-24 trade-in audit.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import logging
+
+from PIL import Image, UnidentifiedImageError
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# Max longest edge after re-encode. 2400px = enough for retina apt photo,
+# small enough to bound storage & decode cost.
+_MAX_DIMENSION = 2400
+
+# JPEG quality. 85 is industry standard for photos — visually lossless,
+# ~70% size reduction vs original phone JPEGs.
+_JPEG_QUALITY = 85
+
+# Output content type after sanitization (all inputs transcoded to JPEG).
+SANITIZED_CONTENT_TYPE = "image/jpeg"
+
+
+class ImageSanitizationError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when inbound bytes cannot be decoded as an image."""
+
+
+def sanitize_image(content: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
+    """Decode arbitrary image bytes and re-encode as clean JPEG.
+
+    Args:
+        content: raw uploaded bytes from the client.
+
+    Returns:
+        (sanitized_bytes, "image/jpeg") — both ready for storage/serving.
+
+    Raises:
+        ImageSanitizationError: bytes are not a recognized image format.
+    """
+    try:
+        with Image.open(io.BytesIO(content)) as img:
+            img.load()  # force full decode; surfaces UnidentifiedImageError early
+            # Convert any mode (RGBA, P, CMYK, ...) to RGB for JPEG output.
+            if img.mode != "RGB":
+                img = img.convert("RGB")
+            # Resize if oversized; preserve aspect ratio.
+            if max(img.size) > _MAX_DIMENSION:
+                img.thumbnail((_MAX_DIMENSION, _MAX_DIMENSION), Image.Resampling.LANCZOS)
+            buf = io.BytesIO()
+            # save() does NOT carry over .info / EXIF unless we pass exif=...; we don't.
+            img.save(buf, format="JPEG", quality=_JPEG_QUALITY, optimize=True)
+            return buf.getvalue(), SANITIZED_CONTENT_TYPE
+    except UnidentifiedImageError as e:
+        raise ImageSanitizationError("not a recognized image format") from e
+    except Exception as e:
+        # PIL can raise broad errors (DecompressionBombError, OSError on truncated, ...);
+        # normalize to one user-facing error type.
+        logger.warning("image sanitization failed: %s", e)
+        raise ImageSanitizationError(f"image decode failed: {e}") from e
diff --git a/tradein-mvp/backend/pyproject.toml b/tradein-mvp/backend/pyproject.toml
index 81f72c5a..63feb98b 100644
--- a/tradein-mvp/backend/pyproject.toml
+++ b/tradein-mvp/backend/pyproject.toml
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ dependencies = [
     "pydantic>=2.7.0",
     "pydantic-settings>=2.3.0",
     "psycopg[binary]>=3.2.0",
+    "Pillow>=10.3.0",             # photo sanitization re-encode (#6 audit fix)
     "weasyprint>=62.0",
     "jinja2>=3.1.0",
     "httpx>=0.27.0",              # для geocoder + scrapers